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THE UNFORESEEN COSTS OF GOING TO TRIAL:  
THE VITALITY OF 212(C) RELIEF FOR LAWFUL 
PERMANENT RESIDENTS CONVICTED BY TRIAL 
Mark J. DiFiore* 
 
Before 1996, a Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR) who was made
deportable by a criminal conviction could apply for discretionary relief 
from deportation under section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act.  This relief, commonly known as “212(c) relief,” was repealed in 1996.  
In 2001, the Supreme Court confronted the issue of whether an LPR with a 
pre-1996 deportable conviction could apply for 212(c) relief in his later 
post-repeal removal proceedings.  The Court decided that an LPR who 
pleaded guilty to his pre-1996 conviction could still apply for 212(c) relief 
following the 1996 repeal.  The status of those LPRs who were convicted of 
their pre-1996 offense after a trial remained unclear.  Today, the courts of 
appeals are split on whether LPRs convicted at trial before the repeal of 
section 212(c) have access to this relief from deportation in their post-1996 
removal proceedings stemming from that conviction. 
This Note examines and synthesizes the different approaches and
resolutions of the courts of appeals.  This Note then undertakes an analysis 
of whether the repeal of 212(c) relief is impermissibly retroactive as to 
LPRs subject to post-1996 removal proceedings for pre-1996 convictions at 
trial.  Finally, this Note argues that 212(c) relief should remain available to 
all LPRs in post-1996 removal proceedings stemming from their pre-1996 
convictions, whether the conviction was by plea agreement or by trial. 
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INTRODUCTION 
An immigrant is admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent 
resident (LPR)1 in 1977.  In 1986, a jury convicts her of possessing and 
intending to distribute thirty grams of cocaine, an offense that makes her 
deportable from the United States.  Had the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) promptly instituted deportation proceedings against her, she 
would have been eligible to apply for a waiver of deportation under section 
212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).2  This relief is 
commonly known as “212(c) relief.”  However, the INS does not charge the 
LPR as being deportable due to her conviction until 1998.  In the meantime, 
section 304(b) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA)3 repeals 212(c) relief in its entirety.4  
Therefore, in the 1998 removal proceedings,5 212(c) relief is no longer 
available to save the LPR from removal.  However, since she could have 
applied for 212(c) relief at the time of her conviction, is it possible for her 
to utilize it during her post-repeal removal proceedings?  That is, does the 
repeal of 212(c) relief have an impermissible retroactive effect6 as to LPRs 
in her situation? 
 
 1. A lawful permanent resident (LPR) is a noncitizen authorized to live and work in the 
United States permanently. See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 101(a)(20), 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (2006); STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND 
POLICY 9 (4th ed. 2005).  As proof of this status, an individual is issued a permanent resident 
card that is widely known as a “green card.” Green Card (Permanent Residence), U.S. 
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis (follow “Green 
Card (Permanent Residence)” hyperlink) (last updated Sept. 1, 2009).  LPRs are 
interchangeably referred to as “legal permanent residents.”  For a further discussion on what 
it means to be an LPR and the various ways to obtain this status, see infra section I.B.2.a. 
 2. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–
1537 (2006)); see id. § 212(c), 66 Stat. at 187 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) 
(1994) (repealed 1996)). 
 3. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 8 and 18 U.S.C.). 
 4. Id. § 304(b), 110 Stat. at 3009-597. 
 5. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
(IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546, consolidated exclusion and deportation 
proceedings, the two main procedures that were used to keep individuals out of the United 
States, into one procedure called “removal” proceedings, see id. §§ 304, 308, 110 Stat. at 
3009-587, 3009-614.  Thus, after 1996, procedures keeping an individual out of the United 
States are all “removal” proceedings.  However, this Note continues to speak in terms of 
“deportation,” even for post-1996 proceedings, for convenience and clarity alone. See infra 
notes 47–54 and accompanying text. 
 6. For a discussion of what makes a statute impermissibly retroactive, see infra notes 
170–88188 and accompanying text.  Essentially, a retroactive law is one that looks 
backwards to change the consequences of an act that has already occurred. See BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1432 (9th ed. 2009).  The U.S. Supreme Court has defined an 
impermissibly retroactive law as one that “takes away or impairs vested rights acquired 
under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new 
disability, in respect to transactions . . . already past.” Soc’y for the Propagation of the 
Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. 756, 767 (C.C.D.N.H. 1814) (No. 13,156); see Hughes Air-
craft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 947 (1997) (citing to Wheeler for 
the definition of impermissible retroactivity). 
652 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
These are the facts of the case of Sandra Ferguson.7  The Supreme Court 
in INS v. St. Cyr8 came close to answering her questions in holding that the 
repeal did in fact have an impermissible retroactive effect as to those LPRs 
who pleaded guilty to their pre-repeal deportable offense.9  Thus, an LPR 
who pleaded guilty to a deportable offense before the repeal of section 
212(c) and who otherwise would have been eligible for 212(c) relief can 
still utilize the deportation waiver even though the relief is not applied for 
until after the repeal, when removal proceedings are commenced.10  
However, Ferguson—and many others like her—did not plead guilty to her 
offense; she was convicted after a trial. 
Several U.S. courts of appeals have decided that this distinction makes a 
great difference and hold that LPRs like Ferguson are not eligible for 212(c) 
relief.11  Other U.S. courts of appeals believe the distinction makes 
no difference and apply the rule of St. Cyr12 to all those convicted of 
a deportable offense before the repeal of section 212(c), regardless of the 
mode of conviction.13  Still other U.S. courts of appeals allow some LPRs 
convicted at trial to remain eligible for 212(c) relief after 
its repeal, contingent on the LPR showing some sort of reliance on 
the continuing existence of the relief before its repeal.14 
The issue of whether and how reliance should factor into the retroactivity 
analysis of the repeal of 212(c) also divides the circuit courts of appeals.  
Some courts require no reliance at all to make the repeal of 
212(c) impermissibly retroactive.  Other courts require an LPR to prove that 
he individually relied on the continuing existence of 212(c) relief in order to 
make the repeal of the relief impermissibly retroactive.  Still others are 
satisfied if the individual proves that he or others similarly situated could 
have objectively and reasonably relied on the continuing existence of the 
relief. 
Unfortunately for Ferguson, her case arose in the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit, where all LPRs convicted of 
their deportable offense at trial are held to be ineligible for 212(c) relief 
when removal proceedings are not commenced until after the repeal.15  Had 
her case arisen in the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Third or 
Eighth Circuits, she undoubtedly would have been eligible to apply for 
 
 7. Ferguson v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 563 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. 
Ct. 1735 (2010). 
 8. 533 U.S. 289 (2001). 
 9. Id. at 326. 
 10. Id.  It is standard procedure for an LPR not to file an application for 212(c) relief 
until after deportation proceedings are commenced. See 1 NAT’L IMMIGRATION PROJECT, 
NAT’L LAWYERS GUILD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND DEFENSE § 8:41 n.1, at 8-91 (3d ed. 2010); 
infra note 95 and accompanying text. 
 11. See infra Part II.C. 
 12. See supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text. 
 13. See infra Part II.A. 
 14. See infra Part II.B. 
 15. See Ferguson v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 563 F.3d 1254, 1271 (11th Cir. 2009), cert. 
denied, 130 S. Ct. 1735 (2010). 
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212(c) relief.16  By virtue of this division, Ferguson was denied 
the opportunity to stay in the United States—an opportunity she would have 
had were she tried in another circuit.  This Note examines the differing 
approaches the circuit courts take in deciding whether an LPR convicted at 
trial of a deportable offense before the repeal of 212(c) relief can still rely 
on this relief after the repeal. 
The availability of relief, repealed about fourteen years ago, is still 
relevant today for several procedural and practical reasons.17  First, appeals 
of removal decisions may lead to various procedural steps that can take 
many years.  Ferguson’s removal, which began in 1998,18 is a good 
example.  An immigration judge (IJ) ordered her removed in 1999, but a 
series of appeals and remands in light of new Supreme Court law 
significantly slowed the progression of the case to the Eleventh Circuit.19  
This procedural posture extended the case to 2009, an illustration of how 
the availability of 212(c) relief is a live issue for federal courts today. 
In addition, LPRs with old, pre-repeal convictions are still subject to 
removal proceedings today because immigration officials are often slow to 
learn of an LPR’s status as removable until the LPR takes some other action 
bringing this fact to their attention.20  For example, a removable LPR may 
not be exposed as such until he leaves the country and presents himself for 
inspection on return21 or when he applies for naturalization.22   
Old convictions are also frequently coming to light because of 
increasingly invasive techniques used by Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE).  Home raids and workplace raids initially aimed at 
seeking out violent immigrant gang members, or those unauthorized to 
work in the United States, often result in removal proceedings against other 
 
 16. See Atkinson v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 479 F.3d 222, 230 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(holding that the repeal of section 212(c) is impermissibly retroactive as to all individuals 
who were made deportable by conviction by a jury before the relief’s repeal); see also Lovan 
v. Holder, 574 F.3d 990, 993 (8th Cir. 2009) (following the Third Circuit’s decision in 
Atkinson); Jeff Joseph et al., The Importance of Finding the “Right” Circuit for Your Immi-
gration Case, IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS, Apr. 2009, at 1, 4 (explaining that a practitioner whose 
noncitizen client seeks 212(c) relief will want to litigate his case in the Third Circuit). 
 17. See Brief of Amici Curiae Immigration Defense Project et al. in Support of 
Petitioner at 3–4, Ferguson v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 1735 (2010) (No. 09-263), 2009 WL 
3155387 at *3–4 (explaining that the continuing availability of 212(c) relief remains 
important for thousands of individuals and their families). 
 18. Ferguson, 563 F.3d at 1256–57. 
 19. See id. at 1257–58.  The new Supreme Court law, INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 
(2001), held that 212(c) relief remained available for LPRs convicted by plea bargain of a 
deportable offense pre-repeal, even though removal proceedings had not begun until after the 
repeal, id. at 326.  For a complete discussion on the decision in St. Cyr, see infra notes 206–
14 and accompanying text. 
 20. See generally Brief of Amici Curiae Immigration Defense Project et al. in Support of 
Petitioner, supra note 17, at 6–13 (describing how LPRs with pre-1996 deportable 
convictions are only coming to immigration officials’ attention now). 
 21. See, e.g., Wilson v. Gonzales, 471 F.3d 111, 113 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 22. See, e.g., Lovan v. Holder, 574 F.3d 990, 992 (8th Cir. 2009); Hernandez de 
Anderson v. Gonzales, 497 F.3d 927, 931 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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non-violent LPRs, who may be removable for a prior criminal conviction.23  
Ferguson is an example of such an individual with an old, deportable 
conviction who was discovered through a workplace raid targeted to find 
unauthorized workers.  Though she was authorized to work in the United 
States, questioning by ICE agents during the raid led to the discovery of her 
very old conviction and subsequent removal proceedings.24  Although these 
enforcement methods, which were ascendant during the Bush presidency, 
have tapered off under President Obama’s leadership,25 they will continue 
to lead to the discovery of pre-1996 criminal convictions. 
The government also likely brings removal proceedings for LPRs whose 
pre-1996 convictions make them deportable because, before 1996, officials 
predicted that these LPRs were likely to be granted 212(c) relief.  The 
process of initiating deportation proceedings was pointless until the relief 
was later repealed.26 
Regardless of the precise reason why 212(c) relief still makes its way 
into courts today, it is indisputable that the relief is still widely relied upon.  
From 2004 to 2008, almost 7000 applications for 212(c) relief were granted 
to LPRs.27  During that time period, 212(c) relief accounted for almost one 
third of the relief from removal granted to LPRs, other than grants of 
asylum.28  Thus, “212(c) relief is still available and does matter.”29  
Furthermore, as the Obama administration continues to make removal of 
 
 23. See Nina Bernstein, Immigrant Workers Caught in a Net Cast for Gangs, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 25, 2007, § 1, at 41; Editorial, The Shame of Postville, Iowa, N.Y. TIMES, July 
13, 2008, at WK11. 
 24. Brief of Amici Curiae Immigration Defense Project et al. in Support of Petitioner, 
supra note 17, at 12–13. 
 25. See, e.g., Ginger Thompson & David M. Herszenhorn, Obama Set for First, 
Tentative Step Today on Immigration Overhaul, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2009, at A16; Ginger 
Thompson, Immigration Agents to Turn Their Focus to Employers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 
2009, at A19. 
 26. See Patricia S. Mann, § 212(c) Litigation:  The Afterlife Of a Waiver, CYRUS D. 
MEHTA & ASSOCIATES, PLLC – IMMIGRATION UPDATES (Mar. 10, 2008), 
http://www.cyrusmehta.com/news.aspx?Main_Idx=ocyrus200591724845&SubIdx=&Page=
4&Year=2008&Month=3; see also Gordon, 17 I. & N. Dec. 389, 392 (B.I.A. 1980) 
(Appleman, A.L.J., concurring) (“[An Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)] 
District Director has every right, in fact, a duty, to exercise his prosecutive judgment wheth-
er or not to institute a deportation proceeding against an alien who appears to be illegally in 
the United States.  If, in screening the file of, and possibly after consultation with, such an 
alien, it appears to him that a deportation proceeding would surely result in a grant of section 
212(c) relief . . . it would be pointless to institute an expensive, vexatious, and needless 
deportation proceeding.”); Thom v. Ashcroft, 369 F.3d 158, 166 (2d Cir. 2004) (suggesting 
that the scenario raised by the concurrence in Gordon is a likely one). 
 27. See EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2008 
STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK R3 (2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/
statspub/fy08syb.pdf. 
 28. See id. 
 29. Philip Levin, Cancellation of Removal for Permanent Resident Aliens, in 1 AM. 
IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASS’N, IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAW HANDBOOK 625, 632 
(R. Patrick Murphy et al. eds., 1999–2000 ed. 1999).  Although this quotation is about ten 
years old, its force is not lost.  As long as cases continue to take many years to get to the 
circuit courts, 212(c) relief will remain available and relevant. 
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the criminally convicted a key priority,30 the importance of this relief will 
only escalate. 
This Note attempts to resolve the differing approaches the courts take 
when confronted with situations similar to Ferguson’s.  That is, it endeavors 
to answer whether an LPR convicted at trial of a deportable offense before 
the repeal of 212(c) relief should be able to rely on this waiver of 
deportation even though deportation proceedings were not commenced until 
after the 1996 repeal of this relief.  Part I of this Note discusses the relevant 
immigration laws, 212(c), and retroactivity jurisprudence necessary to 
understand the current circuit conflict.  Part II analyzes the differing 
approaches the circuit courts take in deciding whether an LPR convicted at 
trial of a deportable offense before the repeal of section 212(c) can still rely 
on this relief after its repeal.  This analysis places special emphasis on the 
role each circuit assigns to reliance in its retroactivity analysis.  Part III 
argues that reliance should not be the determinative factor in 212(c) 
retroactivity analysis.  Rather, the proper resolution is to categorically allow 
all LPRs convicted of their deportable offense before the repeal of 212(c) to 
apply for such relief, regardless of the mode of their conviction. 
I.  THE A, B, CS OF 212(C) RELIEF 
Some background information on immigration law and section 212(c) of 
the INA is necessary to understand the different approaches the courts of 
appeals take in deciding whether LPRs can still use this repealed relief 
today.  Part I.A discusses general immigration law and procedure to trace 
how cases involving 212(c) relief appear in federal courts long after its 
repeal.  Part I.B explores the history of 212(c) relief, including its origin 
and enactment, how it operated, and how it was amended and eventually 
repealed.  Finally, Part I.C first provides background information on 
retroactivity analysis in general and then explains how the Supreme Court 
has handled the issue of the retroactivity of section 212(c). 
A.  Fundamentals of Immigration Law 
Congress has plenary power to make rules governing the admission of 
aliens31 and to exclude aliens of its choosing.32  Congress granted the 
authority to administer immigration laws to the executive branch.33  The 
executive branch contains several agencies that carry out this 
responsibility.34  A familiarity with these agencies, especially those 
responsible for deportation proceedings, is important to understand how 
 
 30. See Miriam Jordan, Feds Target Illegal Immigrants with Criminal Pasts, WALL ST. 
J., Dec. 12–13, 2009, at A4. 
 31. An “alien” is defined in the INA as “any person not a citizen or national of the 
United States.” Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (2006).  
Thus, LPRs are “aliens,” as they are not citizens of the United States. 
 32. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972). 
 33. ROBERT C. DIVINE & R. BLAKE CHISAM, IMMIGRATION PRACTICE § 2-1, at 2-2 
(2009–2010 ed. 2009). 
 34. Id. 
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LPRs seeking 212(c) relief make their way into federal courts.  It is also 
critical to understand the distinction between exclusion and deportation and 
the procedural aspects of the latter. 
1.  Administrative Structure of Federal Immigration Power 
In 1952, Congress enacted the McCarran-Walter Act, the INA, which 
became the framework for modern immigration law.35  The INA 
consolidated the previously scattered immigration laws into one organized 
and comprehensive statute.36  This act delegated most immigration matters 
to the head of the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Attorney General.37  
The Attorney General delegated this authority to the INS, a part of the 
DOJ.38  However, the Homeland Security Act of 200239 dissolved the INS 
effective March 1, 2003 and distributed many of its duties to the newly 
created Department of Homeland Security (DHS) while leaving the 
adjudicative function of immigration affairs in the DOJ.40 
The Attorney General, as the head of the DOJ, still retains a great deal of 
authority over immigration matters, even after the creation of the DHS, 
through his power to direct and regulate the DOJ’s Executive Office for 
Immigration Review (EOIR).41  The EOIR is responsible for the majority of 
decisions involving the removal of noncitizens.42  Within the EOIR, the 
Office of the Chief Immigration Judge oversees U.S. immigration courts 
and immigration judges43 and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) 
decides all appeals from decisions made in immigration court.44  Also, the 
Attorney General remains the “ultimate authority for interpreting ‘all 
questions of law’ in immigration matters.”45  This is done through his 
 
 35. See generally Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No.  82-414, 66 
Stat. 163 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (2006)); RICHARD A. BOSWELL, 
ESSENTIALS OF IMMIGRATION LAW 8 (Stephanie L. Browning ed., 2006). 
 36. DAVID WEISSBRODT & LAURA DANIELSON, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE:  IN 
A NUTSHELL 15 (5th ed. 2005); see also Immigration and Nationality Act, U.S. CITIZENSHIP 
AND IMMIGR. SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis (follow “Laws” hyperlink; 
then follow “Immigration and Nationality Act” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 23, 2010). 
 37. See DIVINE & CHISAM, supra note 33, § 2-2, at 2-2. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 5, 6, 18, 44, and 49 U.S.C.). 
 40. DIVINE & CHISAM, supra note 33, § 2-2, at 2-2 to 2-3.  The Department of Homeland 
Security encompasses three agencies:  U.S. Citizen and Immigration Services (USCIS), U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE). BOSWELL, supra note 35, at 2. 
 41. See DIVINE & CHISAM, supra note 33, § 2-2(b), at 2-30 (“The [DOJ] still has plenty 
to do with immigration policy and mechanics.”).  See 8 C.F.R. pt. 1003 (2010) for an over-
view of the organization and procedures of the EOIR. See also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUST. – 
EXECUTIVE OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., http://www.justice.gov/eoir/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2010). 
 42. BOSWELL, supra note 35, at 3. 
 43. See DIVINE & CHISAM, supra note 33, § 2-2(b)(1)(A), at 2-31. 
 44. See id. § 2-2(b)(1)(B), at 2-33. 
 45. Anthony Distinti, Note, Gone But Not Forgotten:  How Section 212(c) Relief Con-
tinues To Divide Courts Presiding Over Indictments for Illegal Reentry, 74 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2809, 2814 (2006) (quoting ROBERT C. DIVINE & R. BLAKE CHISAM, IMMIGRATION 
PRACTICE § 2-2, at 2-3 n.6 (2005–2006 ed. 2005)). 
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power to review, amend, and overturn individual decisions of the BIA, 
which then become binding on all IJs across the United States.46 
2.  Removal:  Exclusion and Deportation 
The cases before IJs, the BIA, and the federal courts that involve 212(c) 
relief usually stem from the government’s attempt to remove an LPR from 
the United States.  Before the enactment of IIRIRA, there were two separate 
processes for control of immigrants—“exclusion” and “deportation.”47  
Deportation pertained to individuals who had already “entered” the United 
States, whether they had entered legally or illegally, while exclusion 
applied only to those who had not “entered” the United States.48  IIRIRA 
changed this formal distinction from one of “entry” to one of “admission”:  
currently, if a noncitizen has not been admitted, whether or not he is 
physically present in the United States, he faces exclusion, while one 
legally admitted faces deportation.49  The only people who are now 
technically deported, then, are those who are in the United States legally; 
everyone else is excluded. 
IIRIRA also created a single formal proceeding—to be used regardless of 
whether the noncitizen was technically being excluded or deported—called 
a removal proceeding.50  Although the formal distinction between exclusion 
and deportation was eliminated, IIRIRA preserved the fundamental 
distinction, listing separate grounds of inadmissibility for noncitizens 
seeking admission to the United States,51 and grounds of deportability for 
noncitizens already admitted to the United States.52  Also, the availability of 
some reliefs from removal, namely 212(c) relief, hinge on which set of 
grounds apply to the noncitizen.53 
 
 46. See LEGOMSKY, supra note 1, at 4. 
 47. See id. at 496. 
 48. See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 25 (1982); LEGOMSKY, supra note 1, at 
496. 
 49. See LEGOMSKY, supra note 1, at 496; see also Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 301(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 
3009-575 (codified as amended at Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a) (2006)) (substituting a definition for “admission” for a definition of “entry”); 5 
CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN & STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, IMMIGRATION LAW AND 
PROCEDURE § 63.01[3], at 63-7 to 63-8, § 64.01[2], at 64-6 to 64-7 (rev. ed. 1966) 
(explaining IIRIRA’s changes to terminology).  “Admission” is defined as the “lawful entry 
of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration 
officer.” Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(13)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A).  The 
main difference in the change of terminology is that now, a noncitizen who has “entered” the 
United States, but has done so without inspection—that is, he has not been “admitted”—will 
be “inadmissible,” rather than “deportable” under prior law. See 5 GORDON ET AL., supra, 
§ 63.01[3], at 63-7. 
 50. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. 
 51. See id. § 1182(a).  “Inadmissible” is also the new term that functions as the 
equivalent of what was previously “excludable.” See LEGOMSKY, supra note 1, at 496. 
 52. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a). 
 53. See infra Part I.B.2.d (explaining that 212(c) relief is only available as a waiver of 
deportation if the grounds for deportation have a comparable ground for exclusion). 
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Essentially, then, the traditional distinction between exclusion and 
deportation remains, although it is now referred to as a distinction between 
inadmission and deportation, and all proceedings are referred to as removal 
proceedings.54  Even though this Note deals primarily with proceedings 
initiated after IIRIRA, rendering them all removal proceedings, the terms 
“exclusion” and “deportation” remain useful in distinguishing between the 
grounds for removal relied upon and the types of discretionary relief 
available.  Thus, for convenience alone, this Note continues to use the terms 
“exclusion” and “deportation” for proceedings that are actually removal 
proceedings. 
3.  The Basics of Deportation 
Certain crimes—such as “crimes of moral turpitude,” “aggravated 
felonies,” controlled substance offenses, certain firearm offenses, and 
crimes of domestic violence, stalking, or child abuse—make a noncitizen 
deportable.55  Deportation proceedings are “quasi-judicial, adversarial, civil 
proceedings in which an alien may attempt to challenge the government’s 
allegations and/or seek relief from removal.”56  The DHS acts through one 
of its branches, ICE, to prosecute noncitizens in these proceedings.57  For 
LPRs, the government bears the burden of proving by “clear, unequivocal, 
and convincing evidence” that the individual is deportable.58  The 
proceedings are conducted in an immigration court before an IJ.59  
Significantly, IJs have the authority to consider and decide on claims for 
discretionary relief from removal,60 such as 212(c) relief.61  At the 
conclusion of a removal hearing, an IJ typically rules immediately, deciding 
whether the noncitizen is removable and whether she is eligible for any 
forms of discretionary relief for which she may have applied.62 
Either party then has the right to appeal the IJ’s decision to the BIA,63 the 
“highest administrative body for interpreting and applying immigration 
 
 54. LEGOMSKY, supra note 1, at 496. 
 55. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2).  This list is not exhaustive. See id. 
 56. DIVINE & CHISAM, supra note 33, § 11-1, at 11-2; cf. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 
U.S. 1032, 1038–39 (1984) (characterizing deportation hearings as purely civil actions).  
Although the proceedings are civil and not criminal, and thus, the respondent does not enjoy 
all of the protections that apply in a criminal trial, id. at 1038, the respondent is the 
beneficiary of full procedural due process, including the right to a fair trial, see Landon v. 
Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32–33 (1982).  However, there is no constitutional right to counsel in 
deportation proceedings. Careen Shannon, Regulating Immigration Legal Service Providers:  
Inadequate Representation and Notario Fraud, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 577, 583 (2009).  For a 
discussion of the problems this poses, see generally Noel Brennan, A View from the 
Immigration Bench, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 623 (2009) and Shannon, supra. 
 57. DIVINE & CHISAM, supra note 33, § 11-1, at 11-3. 
 58. Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966). 
 59. See BOSWELL, supra note 35, at 38–39. 
 60. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11 (2010). 
 61. Id. § 1212.3(e). 
 62. See BOSWELL, supra note 35, at 39. 
 63. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.3, 1003.38. 
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laws.”64  Decisions of the BIA are binding on all immigration courts, but 
the Attorney General or a federal court may modify or overturn them.65  
Although Congress has divested the federal courts of jurisdiction to review 
final orders of removal in many circumstances,66 nothing precludes judicial 
review of constitutional claims or questions of law brought to the 
appropriate circuit court of appeals.67  Thus, a noncitizen who raises a pure 
question of law—such as whether the repeal of 212(c) relief is 
impermissibly retroactive—is entitled to judicial review in the appropriate 
court of appeals.68  It is through this progression that 212(c) relief, which 
usually has its beginnings in removal proceedings, makes its way into the 
federal court decisions that this Note discusses and analyzes. 
B.  The Life and Death of Section 212(c) 
This section provides background on the specific provision of the INA 
that is at issue in this Note, section 212(c).  Former section 212(c) of the 
INA provided relief from exclusion for certain LPRs meeting its statutory 
criteria.69  Section 212(c) essentially allowed LPRs who were made 
deportable by a criminal conviction to have this deportation waived at the 
discretion of the Attorney General.70  Granting relief terminates the 
deportation proceedings, and the noncitizen remains an LPR.71  This section 
explores the history of this form of relief, from its beginnings, to its use in 
practice, to its amendments and eventual repeal. 
1.  Origins and Enactment 
Throughout the history of immigration law, Congress has created 
different standards for admission to and deportation from the United States, 
on the premise that what might be a good reason to deny a newcomer entry 
may not also be a good reason to expel an LPR with roots in the United 
States.72  However, under the “entry” standard before IIRIRA, an LPR who 
 
 64. Board of Immigration Appeals, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUST. – EXECUTIVE OFF. FOR 
IMMIGR. REV., http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/biainfo.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2010). 
 65. Id. 
 66. See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act § 242(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) 
(2006) (establishing that no court has jurisdiction to review a final order of removal of a 
noncitizen who is removable for conviction of an aggravated felony, a controlled substance 
offense, or certain firearm offenses, among others). 
 67. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). 
 68. See, e.g., Ferguson v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 563 F.3d 1254, 1259 (11th Cir. 2009), 
cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1735 (2010); Garcia-Padron v. Holder, 558 F.3d 196, 199 (2d Cir. 
2009); Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88, 98 n.7 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 69. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994) (repealed 
1996). 
 70. See id.; see also supra note 55 and accompanying text (discussing which criminal 
offenses make an LPR deportable). 
 71. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 295 (2001). 
 72. See Abebe v. Gonzales, 493 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining that it is 
rational to turn away a noncitizen with a contagious disease seeking entry while at the same 
time allowing noncitizens who contract the same disease while living in the United States to 
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gained entry and developed ties to the United States, temporarily left the 
country, and attempted to return would be placed in the same position as a 
first-time entrant in the eyes of the law; he is just another noncitizen 
seeking entry to the United States.73  Thus, an LPR who was convicted of 
an excludable offense while living in the United States who then 
temporarily left the country and tried to reenter was excluded from reentry.  
This upset the rationales underpinning the exclusion/deportation distinction 
and made even the shortest of overseas travel dangerous for LPRs.74 
To give effect to the preferential treatment to long-term residents, and to 
make the immigration consequences of brief travel overseas for them less 
dangerous, Congress enacted a precursor to 212(c) relief, the Seventh 
Proviso of section 3 of the 1917 Immigration Act.75  The Seventh Proviso 
operated as a waiver of grounds of exclusion for “aliens returning after a 
temporary absence to an unrelinquished United States domicile of seven 
consecutive years.”76  Taken literally, this relief was applicable only to 
those LPRs returning to the United States, not those being deported; that is, 
it applied only to exclusions.77  However, the BIA and the Attorney General 
applied this Proviso to the deportation context because fairness dictates that 
if an LPR can rely on this relief when returning from a temporary stay 
abroad, he should be entitled to rely on it without having traveled abroad.78  
The Attorney General reasoned that “judgment ought not to depend upon 
the technical form of the proceedings.”79 
Before the enactment of the INA, the Senate Judiciary Committee 
criticized the Seventh Proviso and recommended that relief be restricted to 
noncitizens:  (1) lawfully admitted for permanent residence, (2) who had 
 
remain), superseded by Abebe v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1203 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 
S. Ct. 3272 (2010). 
 73. See id. at 1096. 
 74. See id. at 1096–97 (explaining that an LPR who gains entry to the United States and 
builds ties to this country may then commit a crime that does not justify uprooting all these 
longstanding ties to the country; however, such an offense may justify exclusion of a 
newcomer from the United States, and this LPR will be subjected to this heightened scrutiny 
upon a brief excursion abroad and attempt to reenter the United States).  To clarify, take the 
case of an LPR who was lawfully admitted, established a home in the United States, and then 
was convicted of a minor crime many years later.  Assume this crime is an excludable, but 
not a deportable, offense.  He thus would not be deportable for this conviction, but would be 
excludable upon an attempted reentry after a brief visit abroad. See S. REP. No. 81-1515, at 
382 (1950).  The Seventh Proviso of section 3 of the 1917 Immigration Act, the precursor to 
212(c) relief, was enacted to resolve this inequity. See S. REP. No. 63-355, at 6 (1914) 
(adding a seventh provision to section 3 of the 1917 Immigration Act). 
 75. See S. REP. No. 63-355, at 6 (“[I]t seems only just and humane to invest the 
Secretary of Labor with authority to permit the readmission to the United States of aliens 
who have lived here for a long time and whose exclusion after a temporary absence would 
result in peculiar or unusual hardship.”); THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., 
IMMIGRATION:  PROCESS AND POLICY 689 (3d ed. 1995). 
 76. Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 878 (repealed 1952)). 
 77. See Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268, 270 (2d Cir. 1976); ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 
75, at 689; Sarah Koteen Barr, Comment, C is for Confusion:  The Tortuous Path of Section 
212(c) Relief in the Deportation Context, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 725, 729 (2008). 
 78. L-, 1 I. & N. Dec. 1, 5–6 (Att’y Gen. Op. 1940). 
 79. Id. at 5. 
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departed from the United States voluntarily and not under order of 
deportation, and (3) who were not excludable on subversive charges.80  The 
main concern was that an alien could enter the United States illegally, 
commit a crime, leave the country, and then still be able to use the Seventh 
Proviso to obtain permanent resident status.81  Also troublesome to the 
Senate was the possibility that an LPR could be deported and still eligible 
for relief under the Seventh Proviso upon an attempt at reentry.82  In 1952, 
Congress adopted these recommendations in enacting the INA and 
effectively replaced the Seventh Proviso with section 212(c).83 
Much like the Seventh Proviso, section 212(c) was only available to 
noncitizens in exclusion proceedings.84  However, the BIA continued its 
policy of extending this type of relief from the exclusion context to the 
deportation context.85  Initially though, 212(c) relief was only extended to 
the deportation proceedings of an LPR who had previously left the country 
and reentered.86 
Thus, by 1956, a deportable LPR who left the country, reentered without 
incident, and later had deportation proceedings commenced against him, 
was eligible to apply for 212(c) relief.87  However, a deportable LPR who 
never left the country was not eligible for 212(c) relief solely because he 
had not “temporarily proceeded abroad.”88  In 1976, though, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Francis v. INS89 extended 212(c) relief 
to LPRs in deportation proceedings who had never left the country after 
 
 80. See S. REP. No. 81-1515, at 384 (1950). 
 81. See id. at 383–84. 
 82. See id. 
 83. See Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268, 270–71 (2d Cir. 1976); ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra 
note 75, at 690.  For legislative history, see S. REP. No. 82-1137, at 12 (1952). 
 84. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994) (repealed 
1996) (“Aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who temporarily proceeded 
abroad voluntarily and not under an order of deportation, and who are returning to a lawful 
unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years, may be admitted in the discretion of the 
Attorney General . . . .”). 
 85. See G-A-, 7 I. & N. Dec. 274 (B.I.A. 1956); see also ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 
75, at 690 (discussing the case of G-A-); Michael M. Waits, Note, “In Like Circumstances, 
but for Irrelevant and Fortuitous Factors”:  The Availability of Section 212(c) Relief to 
Deportable Legal Permanent Residents, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 465, 476 (2009) (same). 
 86. See G-A-, 7 I. & N. Dec. at 275–76 (focusing on the fact that the applicant 
previously left and reentered the country).  The reason for allowing 212(c) relief for an 
individual in deportation proceedings who had reentered the country since his conviction 
was a fairness concern.  Had 212(c) relief not been available to these individuals, the 
government would have had a simple way to circumvent 212(c) relief:  it could decline to 
exclude a returning noncitizen convict and then, after his reentry, institute deportation 
proceedings that would not afford him the benefit of 212(c) relief. Cf. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., 
supra note 75, at 690 (“[T]he [212(c)] waiver should be available in the deportation 
proceeding when it could have been exercised at time of re-entry and would have wiped out 
the deportation ground.”).  This concern would only be realized if the LPR’s conviction 
made him both excludable and deportable.  Therefore, 212(c) relief is available only for 
deportations for which there is a comparable ground of exclusion. See supra Part I.B.2.d. 
 87. See Francis, 532 F.2d at 269. 
 88. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(c); Francis, 532 F.2d at 269; see also 
Waits, supra note 85, at 477. 
 89. 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976). 
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being convicted of an excludable offense.90  The Second Circuit held that 
“fairness would suggest that an alien whose ties with this country are so 
strong that he has never departed after his initial entry should receive at 
least as much consideration as an individual who may leave and return from 
time to time.”91 
The BIA quickly adopted Francis that same year, holding that LPRs are 
eligible to apply for 212(c) relief regardless of whether they temporarily 
proceeded abroad or not.92  Similarly situated permanent residents, the BIA 
reasoned, should be treated equally with respect to applications for 212(c) 
relief.93  This was the law for 212(c) relief until its repeal in 1996.94 
2.  212(c) Relief in Action 
This Note addresses those LPRs convicted of a deportable criminal 
offense who do not file an application for 212(c) relief until deportation 
proceedings have been initiated.95  In these cases, an LPR submits an 
application on Form I-191 (Application for Advance Permission to Return 
to Unrelinquished Domicile) to the IJ presiding over the deportation 
proceedings, who then rules on the application.96  The text of section 212(c) 
lays out the requirements an individual has to meet to be eligible for the 
relief.97  The statute requires that the noncitizen (1) is an LPR; (2) 
 
 90. See id. at 273.  It was still understood after this decision that 212(c) relief was only 
available in deportation proceedings where the grounds for deportation had an analogous 
ground in the exclusionary context. See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 75, at 697; see also 
infra Part I.B.2.d. 
 91. Francis, 532 F.2d at 273. 
 92. See Silva, 16 I. & N. Dec. 26, 30 (B.I.A. 1976). 
 93. Id. 
 94. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 295–97 (2001) (discussing the application of 
212(c) relief to deportation proceedings, until 1996). 
 95. An LPR has the possibility of filing a 212(c) application affirmatively, before any 
deportation or exclusion proceedings commenced. See 8 C.F.R. § 212.3(b) (2010).  
However, the traditional strategy was to wait for deportation or exclusion proceedings to 
begin before applying for relief, so as not to affirmatively call the noncitizen and his 
deportability to the attention of the INS. See 1 NAT’L IMMIGRATION PROJECT, supra note 10, 
§ 8:41 n.1, at 8-91.  Thus, Most 212(c) applications are filed “defensively”—that is, by non-
citizens who had already been formally placed in removal proceedings—with the 
immigration judge (IJ) presiding over the removal proceedings. See Stephen H. Legomsky, 
Forum Choices for Review of Agency Adjudication:  A Study of the Immigration Process, 71 
IOWA L. REV. 1297, 1358 (1986). 
 96. See 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 49, § 74.04[3][b], at 74-61. 
 97. The text of the last version of the statute reads: 
  Aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who temporarily proceeded 
abroad voluntarily and not under an order of deportation, and who are returning to 
a lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years, may be admitted in 
the discretion of the Attorney General without regard to the provisions of subsec-
tion (a) of this section (other than paragraphs (3) and (9)(C)). . . . This subsection 
shall not apply to an alien who is deportable by reason of having committed any 
criminal offense covered in section 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) of this title, 
or any offense covered by section 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) of this title for which both 
predicate offenses are, without regard to the date of their commission, otherwise 
covered by section 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) of this title. 
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temporarily proceeded abroad voluntarily, not under an order of 
deportation; (3) has an unrelinquished domicile of at least seven 
consecutive years; and (4) is not subject to a bar for specific criminal 
convictions.98  In addition, the noncitizen’s ground for deportation must 
have a comparable ground of exclusion,99 and the Attorney General still 
must decide to exercise his discretion favorably in the particular 
noncitizen’s case.100  Accordingly, several requirements must be met for an 
individual even to be eligible to apply for 212(c) relief.  This part discusses 
each of these requirements in turn. 
a.  Lawfully Admitted for Permanent Residence 
According to the INA, “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” 
means having been granted the privilege of residing permanently in the 
United States as an immigrant.101  A lawful permanent resident is 
sometimes referred to as a “green card” holder.102 
In order to obtain permanent resident status, the noncitizen usually must 
obtain an immigrant visa from a consul abroad and present it for inspection 
at a designated U.S. port or place of entry.103  After this inspection and 
admission, the noncitizen is now a lawful permanent resident.104  There are 
several ways that a noncitizen obtains the necessary visa.105  First, and most 
commonly, noncitizens with a familial relationship to a U.S. citizen or LPR 
can seek admission on the basis of this relationship.106  A noncitizen can 
also obtain a visa through employment in the United States,107 or through a 
“diversity” lottery.108  Each year, 55,000 admissions are granted for 
noncitizens applying for this lottery, with preference for noncitizens from 
countries that have a low representation for admission in the United States 
 
See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 440(d), 
110 Stat. 1214, 1277 (amending Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(c) (1994) (repealed 1996)). 
 98. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994) (repealed 1996). 
 99. See Hernandez-Casillas, 20 I. & N. Dec. 262, 286–87 (Att’y Gen. Op. 1991); supra 
note 86 and accompanying text. 
 100. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994) (repealed 1996) (stating that relief may be granted “in 
the discretion of the Attorney General”). 
 101. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(20), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (2006). 
 102. RANDALL MONGER & NANCY RYTINA, U.S. LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENTS:  2008 1 
(2009), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/
lpr_fr_2008.pdf. 
 103. 1 GORDON ET AL., supra note 49, § 1.03[2][f][i], at 1-36.3. 
 104. See BOSWELL, supra note 35, at 126. 
 105. Id. at 123–24. 
 106. See id. at 123; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (giving the allocation of visas based on 
the closeness of the familial relationship); MONGER & RYTINA, supra note 102, at 3, Table 2 
(calculating that about 64.5% of all LPR admissions from fiscal years 2006 to 2008 were 
through family sponsorship); Jayme A. Feldheim, Note, Ending the Widow Penalty:  Why 
Are Surviving Alien Spouses of Deceased Citizens Being Deported?, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1873, 1878–81 (2009) (explaining how a family member of a U.S. citizen obtains LPR sta-
tus). 
 107. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b). 
 108. See generally id. § 1153(c). 
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over the preceding five years.109  Alternatively, an individual may receive 
LPR status through admission as a refugee or through a grant of asylum.110 
Finally, a noncitizen who is lawfully in the United States as a 
nonimmigrant111 can apply for “adjustment of status” to obtain lawful 
permanent residency.112  An adjustment application is much like the 
process for an immigrant visa, except that the application is pursued 
through U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) from within 
the United States, rather than through a consulate abroad.113 
b.  Temporarily Proceeded Abroad Voluntarily and Not Under an 
Order of Deportation 
As previously discussed, the literal language of section 212(c) makes the 
statute applicable only to noncitizens returning from a temporary absence 
abroad.114  However, after subsequent case law extended this relief to 
individuals in deportation proceedings and not just exclusion 
proceedings,115 the requirement that the individual had temporarily 
proceeded abroad was eradicated.116 
The requirement that the individual did not leave the country under an 
order of deportation was added at the insistence of the Senate at the time of 
the INA’s drafting.117  Even further, if the LPR was in a situation where he 
was returning to the United States, he must have left voluntarily.118  For 
example, a noncitizen who was repatriated to an enemy nation during 
World War II did not depart “voluntarily” and was thus not eligible for 
212(c) relief.119 
 
 109. See id. §§ 1151(e), 1153(c). 
 110. See id. § 1159(a)–(b). 
 111. A “nonimmigrant” is one who falls within one of several specifically enumerated 
categories of typically temporary entrants. LEGOMSKY, supra note 1, at 9.  The most 
common examples are tourists, business visitors, students, and temporary workers. Id.  To 
qualify for admission as a nonimmigrant, the noncitizen must fit one of the statutory 
categories, most of which requires intent to leave the country at the end of the authorized 
period, and the noncitizen must not fall within any “inadmissibility” grounds, such as those 
relating to health, criminal convictions, or national security. Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) 
(discussing “inadmissibility”). 
 112. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1255. 
 113. See BOSWELL, supra note 35, at 148–49; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1255. 
 114. See supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text. 
 115. See supra notes 85–87 and accompanying text. 
 116. See supra notes 88–93 and accompanying text. 
 117. See supra notes 80–83 and accompanying text. 
 118. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994) (repealed 
1996). 
 119. See T-, 6 I. & N. Dec. 778, 781 (B.I.A. 1955) (holding that appellant, a Japanese 
immigrant, who was repatriated to Japan during World War II, had no choice but to return to 
Japan, and thus did not depart the United States “voluntarily” and therefore is ineligible for 
212(c) relief). 
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c.  Lawful Unrelinquished Domicile of Seven Consecutive Years 
212(c) relief is only available to LPRs with a lawful unrelinquished 
domicile of seven consecutive years.120  Although the INA does not define 
the term “lawful domicile,”121 at least one court has held that a “lawful 
domicile” for purposes of 212(c) relief means lawful physical presence and 
the intent to remain in the United States indefinitely.122  This is not 
necessarily the test that every court must follow for determining domicile, 
however; there is much debate about how broadly the term “domicile” 
should be read.123  This Note assumes that the noncitizen simply must have 
been domiciled in the United States for seven years to be eligible for 212(c) 
relief. 
d.  Deportable Based on Conviction for an Offense for Which a 
Comparable Ground for Inadmissibility Exists 
Only those noncitizens that are deportable on grounds that have a 
comparable ground of exclusion may benefit from 212(c) relief.124  This 
requirement is likely connected to the extension of 212(c) relief to 
deportations.  The extension of relief to deportations prevented the inequity 
of deporting a specific group of LPRs without the possibility of 212(c) 
relief.  These were LPRs with a conviction that made them both excludable 
and deportable, and left the country and reentered without exclusion 
proceedings.  Had exclusion proceedings been commenced, 212(c) relief 
would have been available; if the government allowed reentry and then 
brought deportation proceedings, 212(c) relief would not have been 
available.125  As noted, the LPR must have been both excludable and 
deportable for his criminal conviction for this inequity to have arisen.  
Thus, in order to qualify for 212(c) relief, a ground for exclusion must exist 
that is comparable to the ground for deportation.126 
e.  Criminal Bars to 212(c) Relief 
The last version of section 212(c) before its repeal stated that the relief 
was not available to those noncitizens made deportable for committing an 
aggravated felony,127 a controlled substance violation other than a single 
offense for possession of less than thirty grams of marijuana for one’s own 
 
 120. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(c). 
 121. Graham v. INS, 998 F.2d 194, 195 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 122. See Melian v. INS, 987 F.2d 1521, 1524 (11th Cir. 1993); cf. Rosario v. INS, 962 
F.2d 220, 224 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that domicile requires a “fixed, permanent and 
principal home and to which, whenever absent [the noncitizen] always intend[s] to return”). 
 123. See generally Nadine Wettstein, Lawful Domicile for Purposes of INA § 212(c):  
Can It Begin with Temporary Residence?, 71 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1273 (Sept. 26, 1994); 
Mark A. Hall, Comment, Lawful Domicile Under Section 212(c) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 771 (1980). 
 124. See Hernandez-Casillas, 20 I. & N. Dec. 262, 286–87 (Att’y Gen. Op. 1991). 
 125. See supra note 86. 
 126. Hernandez-Casillas, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 286–87. 
 127. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2006). 
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use,128 certain firearms offenses,129 or several other miscellaneous crimes, 
including those for espionage, sabotage, treason, and sedition.130 
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) 
enacted this version of 212(c).131  This amendment effectively limited relief 
to those noncitizens who had committed a single crime of moral turpitude 
that did not amount to an aggravated felony.132  The relief was not always 
restricted so severely:  before AEDPA was written into law, only 
noncitizens convicted of aggravated felonies for which five years 
imprisonment had actually been served were ineligible for relief,133 and 
before the Immigration Act of 1990 (IMMACT),134 only noncitizens 
convicted from a list of limited offenses were ineligible for relief.135  
Besides removing the five-year requirement, which made all noncitizens 
convicted of an aggravated felony ineligible for 212(c) relief, AEDPA also 
significantly expanded the definition of an “aggravated felony,” making the 
latest version of section 212(c) more restrictive than it had ever been.136 
f.  In the Discretion of the Attorney General 
In addition to proving eligibility with respect to all of the previously 
mentioned factors,137 the noncitizen must also prove that she deserves a 
favorable exercise of the Attorney General’s discretion in granting the 
212(c) application to save her from deportation.138  Relief is granted if a 
 
 128. See id. § 1227(a)(2)(B). 
 129. See id. § 1227(a)(2)(C). 
 130. See id. § 1227(a)(2)(D).  The text of repealed section 212(c) mandates that it shall 
not apply to any alien who is “deportable by reason of having committed any criminal 
offense covered in section 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) of this title . . . .” Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 440(d), 110 Stat. 
1214, 1277 (amending Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994) 
(repealed 1996)).  Noncitizens deportable by reason of two or more crimes of moral 
turpitude arising out of different incidents are also not eligible for 212(c) relief so long as the 
crimes were committed within five years of admission and the sentence for each crime was 
one year or longer. See id. (disallowing relief for aliens covered by section 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) 
of title 8); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)–(ii) (2006). 
 131. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996); see id. § 440(d), 110 Stat. at 1277 
(codified at Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994) (repealed 
1996)). 
 132. 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 49, § 74.04[2][f], at 74-50. 
 133. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994) (repealed 
1996). 
 134. Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
 135. See infra notes 152–58 and accompanying text. 
 136. See 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 49, § 74.04[2][f][i], at 74-52 to 74-53; see 
generally Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 § 440(e) (expanding the 
offenses that qualify as an aggravated felony).  For a discussion on the complex and related 
question of the retroactivity of AEDPA’s new restrictions on 212(c) relief, see 6 GORDON ET 
AL., supra note 49, § 74.04[4][a], at 74-62 to 74-66.1. 
 137. The noncitizen applying for 212(c) relief bears the burden of proving her eligibility. 
See Julie K. Rannik, Note, The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996:  A 
Death Sentence for the 212(c) Waiver, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 123, 134 (1996). 
 138. See Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 587 (B.I.A. 1978) (“A respondent . . . bears the 
burden of demonstrating that discretionary relief should be exercised in his behalf.”). 
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balancing of adverse factors against “social and humane” considerations 
shows that doing so is in the best interests of the United States.139  The 
Attorney General has delegated the discretion to decide 212(c) applications 
to the appropriate immigration officer or judge.140 
The case which most clearly states the relevant factors is Marin.141  
Adverse factors for 212(c) adjudication include the gravity of the 
underlying offense, the existence of other significant violations of United 
States immigration laws, the nature, recency, and seriousness of any 
existing criminal record, and “the presence of other evidence indicative of a 
respondent’s bad character or undesirability as a permanent resident of this 
country.”142  The “social and humane considerations”—or favorable factors 
for an applicant—include familial ties within the United States, a long 
duration of residence in the United States, evidence of hardship to the 
noncitizen and her family should deportation occur, service in the United 
States Armed Forces, a history of employment within the United States, the 
existence of business or property ties within the United States, evidence of 
value and service to the community, proof of genuine rehabilitation should 
a criminal record exist, and other evidence attesting to the noncitizen’s good 
character.143 
For applications for relief for convicted LPRs, IJs are to balance these 
factors, evaluating them on a case-by-case basis.144  Further, as the negative 
factors became more serious, the noncitizen has to demonstrate additional 
favorable factors, which in some cases, such as those involving conviction 
of a serious drug offense, may have required a showing of “unusual or 
outstanding equities.”145  Such a showing does not automatically ensure a 
grant of 212(c) relief, but only satisfies the threshold test that these 
noncitizens must pass to even be eligible for 212(c) relief.146 
3.  Restricting the Relief:  Amendments and Eventual Repeal 
Convicted LPRs under orders of deportation relied strongly upon 
212(c).147  Significantly, between 1989 and 1995, 212(c) relief was granted 
to about 51.5% of applicants for which a final decision was reached, for a 
 
 139. See id. at 584. 
 140. 8 C.F.R. §§ 212.3(a), 1212.3(a) (2010); see also supra note 60 and accompanying 
text. 
 141. 16 I. & N. Dec. 581 (B.I.A. 1978). 
 142. Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. at 584 (citations omitted). 
 143. Id. at 584–85. 
 144. Rannik, supra note 137, at 136. 
 145. See Edwards, 20 I. & N. Dec. 191, 195 (B.I.A. 1990); Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. at 585. 
 146. See, e.g., Guillen-Garcia v. INS, 999 F.2d 199, 203–04 (7th Cir. 1993); Hazzard v. 
INS, 951 F.2d 435, 438 (1st Cir. 1991). 
 147. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 295–96 (2001) (“[T]he class of aliens whose 
continued residence in this country has depended on their eligibility for § 212(c) relief is 
extremely large . . . .”); Nancy Morawetz, INS v. St. Cyr:  The Campaign to Preserve Court 
Review and Stop Retroactive Application of Deportation Laws, in IMMIGRATION STORIES 
279, 281 (David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds., 2005) (“Under [pre-1996] law, relief 
under section 212(c) of the INA served as the principal defense for LPRs who faced 
deportation due to a criminal conviction.”). 
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total of over 10,000 instances of relief granted.148  Even when applications 
were denied, courts of appeals reviewing those decisions vacated those 
denials “on a nontrivial number of occasions.”149 
However, throughout the 1990s, national resentment toward noncitizens 
in the United States grew.150  This resulted in a wave of amendments to 
212(c) relief aimed at limiting its availability and facilitating the 
deportation of criminal LPRs.151  First, in 1990, IMMACT amended 212(c) 
to preclude from relief any noncitizen convicted of an aggravated felony for 
which a term of imprisonment of at least five years was served.152 
On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted AEDPA.153  This bill was in part 
motivated by early beliefs that the bombing of the federal building in 
Oklahoma City the previous year was orchestrated by noncitizen 
terrorists.154  Accordingly, section 440 of the act greatly reduced the rights 
of noncitizens with criminal convictions.155  Section 440(d) of AEDPA 
stripped 212(c) eligibility from all noncitizens who were deportable for 
committing an aggravated felony (regardless of the length of the sentence), 
a controlled substance violation, a firearms offense, or multiple crimes 
involving moral turpitude.156  AEDPA also recategorized many more 
crimes as aggravated felonies, thereby eliminating 212(c) relief “for all but 
the most minor criminal offenses.”157  As a result, 212(c) relief remained 
available only for those who committed a single crime involving moral 
turpitude that did not qualify as an aggravated felony.158  AEDPA also 
specifically provided that the new definitions for aggravated felonies 
 
 148. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 296 & n.5 (citing Rannik, supra note 137, at 150 n.80). 
 149. Reyes-Hernandez v. INS, 89 F.3d 490, 492 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 150. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 104-518, at 119 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1996 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 944, 952 (explaining that the explicit goal of 1996’s AEDPA legislation was 
to enhance “the ability of the United States to deport criminal aliens”); Morawetz, supra note 
147, at 279 (noting that new laws limiting the rights of criminally convicted LPRs were 
motivated by hunches that noncitizens were responsible for the Oklahoma City bombing); 
Ella Dlin, Comment, The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996:  An 
Attempt to Quench Anti-Immigration Sentiments?, 38 CATH. LAW. 49, 55–59 (1998) 
(discussing general anti-immigration sentiment in the United States in the 1990s). 
 151. See Barr, supra note 77, at 731. 
 152. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 511, 104 Stat. 4978, 5052 
(codified at Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (Supp. II 1991) 
(repealed 1996)). 
 153. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 8, 18, 29, 40, and 42 U.S.C.) 
 154. See Morawetz, supra note 147, at 279. 
 155. Id. 
 156. See Abebe v. Gonzales, 493 F.3d 1092, 1099–1100 (9th Cir. 2007), superseded by 
Abebe v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1203 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3272 (2010); 
Michael Boyle, Cancellation of Removal and INA §212(c) Relief for Permanent Residents, in 
1 AM. IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASS’N, IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAW HANDBOOK 112, 
117 (Randy P. Auerbach et al. eds., 2003–2004 ed. 2003). 
 157. Rannik, supra note 137, at 129; see also Anthony Lewis, Op-Ed., Abroad at Home:  
Mr. Smith Tells a Tale, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1997, at A15 (“One would think . . . that the 
term ‘aggravated felons’ meant murderers, rapists and the like.  In fact, the new immigration 
law includes many minor, nonviolent crimes in the definition.”). 
 158. Boyle, supra note 156, at 117. 
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applied to all convictions entered on or after its April 24, 1996 
enactment.159 
Though AEDPA was meant to simplify the deportation of criminal 
noncitizens, it instead created problems relating to the enforcement and 
efficiency of deportation proceedings.160  For example, it inadvertently 
created loopholes that allowed some noncitizens to “thwart enforcement of 
the immigration laws.”161  In other circumstances, AEDPA made some 
noncitizens deportable where deportation was not appropriate.162  In 
response to these problems, Congress enacted IIRIRA just a few months 
later on September 30, 1996.163  IIRIRA repealed 212(c) relief 
altogether,164 replacing it with a newly created form of discretionary relief 
called “Cancellation of Removal,” located in section 240A(a) of the INA.165 
The current cancellation of removal relief is much narrower than older 
versions of section 212(c), as it denies the Attorney General the discretion 
to cancel removal for any noncitizen convicted of an aggravated felony.166  
IIRIRA further limits this relief by redefining the term “aggravated felony” 
to encompass many new offenses, including misdemeanors and low-level 
felonies.167  Most criminal LPRs in exclusion or deportation proceedings 
are thus rendered “statutorily ineligible to apply for relief.”168  By creating 
this new, much narrower form of relief, 212(c) remains the only option for 
many LPRs placed in removal proceedings.  In many cases, an LPR will be 
 
 159. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 
§ 440(f), 110 Stat. 1214, 1278. 
 160. See Distinti, supra note 45, at 2821–22.  “Even President Bill Clinton acknowledged 
that AEDPA made ‘major, ill-advised changes in our immigration laws having nothing to do 
with fighting terrorism.’” Id. (quoting Yen H. Trinh, Note, The Impact of New Policies 
Adopted After September 11 on Lawful Permanent Residents Facing Deportation Under the 
AEDPA and IIRIRA and the Hope of Relief Under the Family Reunification Act, 33 GA. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 543, 549–50 (2005)). 
 161. Kwon v. Comfort, 174 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1143 (D. Colo. 2001) 
 162. See 142 CONG. REC. 27,216 (1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“[T]here might be 
certain rare circumstances we had not contemplated, when removal of a particular criminal 
alien might not be appropriate.”). 
 163. See generally Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
8 and 18 U.S.C.). 
 164. See id. § 304(b), 110 Stat. at 3009-597. 
 165. Immigration and Nationality Act § 240A(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2006).  The repeal 
and enactment were both made effective on April 1, 1997. See Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 § 309(a). 
 166. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3); Vashti D. Van Wyke, Comment, Retroactivity and Im-
migrant Crimes Since St. Cyr:  Emerging Signs of Judicial Restraint, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 
741, 749 (2006). 
 167. See Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass’n, IIRAIRA Reform, AILA INFONET, 
http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?bc=3545 (last visited Oct. 23, 2010) (“Under 
IIRAIRA, crimes as minor as shoplifting now constitute aggravated felonies.”); see also 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 § 321 (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2006)).  Further, this new definition of “aggravated 
felony” applied retroactively; that is, a noncitizen who committed a misdemeanor many 
years ago that was not an “aggravated felony,” and was thus not originally deportable, could 
now be deported without being eligible for cancellation of removal. See Am. Immigration 
Lawyers Ass’n, supra. 
 168. Waits, supra note 85, at 483. 
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clearly ineligible for an exercise of favorable discretion of cancellation of 
removal, but should he be deemed eligible to apply for the repealed 212(c) 
relief, a favorable exercise of discretion that allows the LPR to remain in 
the United States is a real possibility.169 
C.  Retroactivity and 212(c) Relief 
The changes made to section 212(c) instigated a “‘tidal wave’ of judicial 
interpretation” over whether the amendments and eventual repeal 
retroactively eliminated a noncitizen’s eligibility for 212(c) relief.170  That 
is, if an LPR was convicted of a deportable offense before 212(c)’s repeal, 
was she eligible for this relief if deportation proceedings were not 
commenced until after the repeal?  This is the problem of the retroactive 
application of a statutory change.  There is a wealth of Supreme Court 
precedent on retroactivity analysis in general, as well as a developing body 
of case law dealing specifically with the retroactivity of 212(c)’s 
amendments and repeal. 
1.  Landgraf and the Modern Framework for Civil Retroactivity 
Justice Joseph Story offered an influential definition of “retrospectivity,” 
or retroactivity—a now fundamental precept in statutory analysis—which 
the Supreme Court has since adopted171:  “Upon principle every statute, 
which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or 
creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, 
in respect to transactions or considerations already past, must be deemed 
retrospective.”172  A presumption against retroactively attaching new legal 
consequences to acts already committed is deeply rooted in United States 
law and history.173  This is because retroactive statutes raise particular 
concerns, namely, that the legislature will use its powers to suddenly 
 
 169. Cf. Brief of Amici Curiae Immigration Defense Project et al. in Support of 
Petitioner, supra note 17, at 13–18 (explaining that the availability of 212(c) remains “criti-
cal” for thousands of LPRs). 
 170. See 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 49, § 74.04[4], at 74-62 (quoting Catney v. INS, 
178 F.3d 190, 191 (3d Cir. 1999)). 
 171. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 268–69 (1994) (quoting Justice 
Joseph Story’s definition and citing several Supreme Court cases which have since relied on 
Justice Story’s definition). 
 172. Soc’y for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. 756, 767 
(C.C.D.N.H. 1814) (No. 13,156). 
 173. See generally Robert G. Natelson, Statutory Retroactivity:  The Founders’ View, 39 
IDAHO L. REV. 489 (2003) (tracing anti-retroactivity sentiment and laws from Roman times, 
through England, to early America and the Constitution); see also Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265 
(“[T]he presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence, and 
embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic.” (citing Kaiser Aluminum & 
Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 842–44, 855–56 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); 
Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns. 477, 503 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811); Elmer E. Smead, The Rule 
Against Retroactive Legislation:  A Basic Principle of Jurisprudence, 20 MINN. L. REV. 775 
(1936))). 
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“sweep away settled expectations . . . .  as a means of retribution against 
unpopular groups or individuals.”174 
While retroactivity is constitutionally impermissible in the context of 
criminal cases under the Ex Post Facto Clause,175 retroactive civil laws are 
not necessarily impermissible.176  Nevertheless, there is still a presumption 
against retroactive application in the civil context.177  Notably, deportation 
proceedings are a civil remedy, even if the underlying deportation stems 
from a criminal conviction.178  Thus, the repeal of 212(c) relief is not 
governed by the Ex Post Facto Clause, but by the modern framework for 
retroactivity in civil cases that the Supreme Court set out in Landgraf v. USI 
Film Products.179 
Landgraf laid out a two-part test to determine whether a civil law has an 
impermissible retroactive effect.180  First, the court must determine whether 
Congress expressly prescribed the statute’s temporal reach.181  If Congress 
made the scope of the statute clear, the inquiry may end:  Congress’s intent 
only need be carried out.182 
If, however, Congress has not expressly prescribed temporal reach, the 
court must move to a second step to determine whether applying the statute 
to past acts would constitute impermissible retroactivity.183  If applying the 
statute retroactively “would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, 
increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with 
respect to transactions already completed,” then the traditional presumption 
against retroactive application would make such application 
impermissible.184  These are merely sufficient, rather than necessary, 
factors for invoking the presumption against retroactivity.185  The inquiry 
 
 174. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 266.  Notably, immigrants at the time of the enactment of 
IIRIRA were an unpopular group of individuals. See supra notes 150–51 and accompanying 
text. 
 175. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be 
passed.”); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 391 (1798) (holding that the Ex Post Facto 
Clause prohibits retroactive criminal laws). 
 176. See Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 391 (holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause does not 
make impermissible retroactive civil laws). 
 177. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 324 (2001) (citing Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 272); see 
also Van Wyke, supra note 166, at 753 (noting that retroactivity is “heavily disfavored in the 
civil context”). 
 178. See supra note 56 and accompanying text; see also Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 
U.S. 580, 594–95 (1952) (holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause does not apply to the civil 
remedy of deportation). 
 179. 511 U.S. 244 (1994); see also St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 314–26 (relying on Landgraf to 
analyze the permissibility of the retroactivity of the repeal of section 212(c)); Ponnapula v. 
Ashcroft, 373 F.3d 480, 490 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing to Landgraf as the controlling framework 
for assessing the retroactivity of a civil law). 
 180. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id.; see also Van Wyke, supra note 166, at 758. 
 185. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 947 (1997).  
In various cases, the Supreme Court has adopted varying tests and focused on different 
factors in invoking the presumption against retroactivity. See Chambers v. Reno, 307 F.3d 
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essentially amounts to whether new legal consequences have attached to 
past conduct.186  The Court has subsequently accepted and utilized the 
Landgraf framework on several occasions.187  In doing so, it has repeatedly 
counseled that the judgment as to “whether a particular statute acts 
retroactively should be informed and guided by familiar considerations of 
fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations.”188 
2.  St. Cyr and Applying Retroactivity to Section 212(c) 
The retroactive application of the repeal of 212(c) relief has controlled 
and continues to control the fates of thousands of noncitizens.189  Although 
courts were first faced with the retroactive application of AEDPA’s 
restrictive amendments to 212(c) relief,190 this Note is most concerned with 
the retroactivity of IIRIRA’s repeal of 212(c) relief.191  In 2001, the 
Supreme Court considered the retroactivity of 212(c)’s repeal in INS v. St. 
Cyr. 
Enrico St. Cyr was a citizen of Haiti admitted as an LPR to the United 
States in 1986.192  On March 8, 1996, before the effective date of both 
AEDPA and IIRIRA, St. Cyr pleaded guilty to selling a controlled 
substance in violation of Connecticut state law.193  This conviction made St. 
Cyr deportable,194 but under pre-AEDPA law he would have been eligible 
to apply for 212(c) relief.195  However, St. Cyr’s removal proceedings did 
not commence until April 10, 1997, after both AEDPA and IIRIRA had 
gone into effect.196  By the Attorney General’s interpretation of these 
amendments, St. Cyr no longer had the opportunity to file for the relief for 
which he was once eligible.197 
St. Cyr did in fact seek to prevent his removal by applying for 212(c) 
relief.198  An IJ denied St. Cyr’s application and the BIA dismissed his 
appeal, concluding that IIRIRA’s repeal of section 212(c) rendered him 
 
284, 292 (4th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he Supreme Court has not limited its examination of a statute’s 
retroactive effect to one single, rigid test.”). 
 186. See Hughes Aircraft, 520 U.S. at 947–48; Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 269–70; see also 
Van Wyke, supra note 166, at 760, 762. 
 187. See, e.g., Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 37–38 (2006); Martin v. Ha-
dix, 527 U.S. 343, 352 (1999); Hughes Aircraft, 520 U.S. at 946. 
 188. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 321 (2001) (quoting Martin, 527 U.S. at 358 (quoting 
Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 189. See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text. 
 190. See generally 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 49, § 74.04[4][a][i][A], at 74-64 to 74-
65.  For a discussion on AEDPA’s restrictive amendments to 212(c), see supra notes 155–58 
and accompanying text. 
 191. See supra notes 163–69 and accompanying text. 
 192. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 293. 
 193. Id. 
 194. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(B)(i) 
(1994) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006)). 
 195. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 293. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. St. Cyr v. INS, 229 F.3d 406, 409 (2d Cir. 2000), aff’d, 533 U.S. 289 (2001). 
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ineligible for relief.199  St. Cyr then filed a habeas corpus petition in the 
United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, arguing that 
AEDPA and IIRIRA should not be retroactively applied to preclude him 
from 212(c) relief, since his deportable conviction occurred prior to the 
enactment of both statutes.200  The district court agreed with St. Cyr, 
concluding that the law that was in effect at the time of the commission of 
the crime should govern the removal proceedings.201  The Second Circuit 
then utilized the Supreme Court’s Landgraf framework to decide the issue 
itself.202  The court concluded that Congress did not express any clear intent 
as to whether AEDPA and IIRIRA should apply retroactively, and thus 
reached Landgraf’s second step.203  The court then decided that AEDPA 
and IIRIRA, as applied to deportable convictions by guilty or nolo 
contendere pleas that pre-date the statutes’ enactments, have an impermiss-
ible retroactive effect because the legal effect of prior conduct would be 
changed.204  The INS petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which was granted 
by the Supreme Court.205 
In INS v. St. Cyr, the Supreme Court held that 212(c) relief remains 
available for otherwise eligible noncitizens who pleaded guilty to a 
deportable offense before 212(c)’s repeal.206  The Court utilized its own 
Landgraf analysis, and first found that Congress did not affirmatively call 
for retroactive application of IIRIRA’s repeal of 212(c) relief.207  Whereas 
Congress expressly called for retroactive application of other provisions of 
IIRIRA, it was completely silent as to the retroactivity of section 304(b), 
which repealed 212(c).208  In the second step of the analysis, the Court then 
held that “IIRIRA’s elimination of any possibility of § 212(c) relief for 
people who entered into plea agreements with the expectation that they 
would be eligible for such relief clearly ‘attaches a new disability, in respect 
to transactions or considerations already past.’”209 
The Court reasoned that LPRs pleading guilty to deportable offenses 
were engaging in a quid pro quo with the Government.210  In exchange for 
 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Dunbar v. INS, 64 F. Supp. 2d 47, 54 (D. Conn. 1999), aff’d sub nom. St. Cyr, 229 
F.3d 406 (2d Cir. 2000), aff’d, 533 U.S. 289 (2001). 
 202. St. Cyr, 229 F.3d at 412–13, aff’d, 533 U.S. 289. 
 203. Id. at 413–17. 
 204. Id. at 418–19. 
 205. INS v. St. Cyr, 531 U.S. 1107 (2001). 
 206. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 326. 
 207. Id. at 320. 
 208. See id. at 318–20 & n.43 (citing to multiple sections of IIRIRA where Congress 
explicitly proscribed that specific amendments to the INA were to be applied retroactively); 
see, e.g., Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-208, § 321(c), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-628 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2006))  
(mandating that new definitions for aggravated felonies “shall apply to actions taken on or 
after the date of the enactment of [IIRIRA], regardless of when the conviction occurred”). 
 209. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 321 (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 269 
(1994)); accord id. at 325 (“There is a clear difference, for the purposes of retroactivity 
analysis, between facing possible deportation and facing certain deportation.”). 
 210. Id. at 321–22. 
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some perceived benefit—the continuing availability and eligibility for 
212(c) relief—the LPR waived his constitutional right to a jury trial and 
gave the government tangible benefits, namely prompt closure of the case 
without the expenditure of prosecutorial resources.211  Because individuals 
like St. Cyr “almost certainly” relied on the availability of 212(c) relief in 
deciding to forgo a trial, IIRIRA’s elimination of any possibility of relief 
has an “obvious and severe retroactive effect.”212  Thus, 212(c) relief was 
held to remain available to those noncitizens, like St. Cyr, whose deportable 
conviction was obtained through a guilty plea before the repeal, and who 
otherwise would have been eligible for such relief at the time of their plea 
under the law then in effect.213  The DOJ later codified this ruling.214 
The case of Enrico St. Cyr sufficiently demonstrates the importance of 
this new rule.  After the Supreme Court rendered its decision, St. Cyr had a 
hearing before an IJ and received relief under section 212(c).215  He would 
have been removed had the Supreme Court not held that he was eligible to 
apply for 212(c) relief, but as a result of this ruling, he could stay in the 
United States.216  Countless others in St. Cyr’s situation had similar 
hearings and were granted 212(c) relief.217 
However beneficial this decision may have been to those LPRs who had 
pleaded guilty to their deportable offense before repeal, it did not address 
how to treat LPRs who did not plead guilty.218  Instead, those convicted of a 
deportable offense after a trial were without a clear answer.  The remainder 
of this Note deals with the question of whether an LPR convicted at trial of 
a deportable offense before IIRIRA repealed 212(c) relief can still rely on 
this waiver even though deportation proceedings are not commenced until 
after the relief’s repeal.  Part II addresses and analyzes the different ways 
the federal courts approach and resolve this issue. 
 
 211. Id.  The LPR’s benefit from pleading guilty to a deportable offense, for example, 
could be “to ensure that he got less than five years to avoid what would have been a statutory 
bar on 212(c) relief.” Id. at 323 (quoting Jideonwo v. INS, 224 F.3d 692, 699 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 212. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 325.  Specifically, before the repeal of 212(c), there was a 
rather strong likelihood that an individual like St. Cyr would garner a favorable exercise of 
discretion. See supra notes 147–49 and accompanying text.  Now that the likelihood of such 
relief would be zero should the Supreme Court have held the other way, there were obvious 
retroactive effects of the repeal. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 321 (holding that “IIRIRA’s 
elimination of any possibility of § 212(c) relief” clearly has a retroactive effect). 
 213. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 326. 
 214. See 8 C.F.R. § 1212.3(h) (2010). 
 215. See Morawetz, supra note 147, at 306. 
 216. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 217. Morawetz, supra note 147, at 306.  However, thousands of others were deported 
before the decision in St. Cyr, and were thus denied the benefit of this ruling. Id. at 280.  
These individuals were denied the opportunity to come back and reap the benefit of St. Cyr, 
as the government issued regulations allowing for reopening only for those who had yet to 
be deported. Id. 
 218. See Nancy Morawetz, Determining the Retroactive Effect of Laws Altering the 
Consequences of Criminal Convictions, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1743, 1748 (2003) 
(explaining that St. Cyr was limited to persons who had entered plea agreements). 
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II.  EXPLORING THE APPROACHES:  POST-REPEAL 212(C) ELIGIBILITY FOR 
LPRS CONVICTED AT TRIAL 
St. Cyr made clear that those LPRs who had pleaded guilty to their 
deportable offenses pre-repeal could still attain 212(c) relief,219  but left 
uncertain the fates of LPRs who had obtained their convictions after a trial.  
Part II of this Note analyzes the retroactive effect of the repeal of section 
212(c) on those LPRs who did not plead guilty, but were instead convicted 
of a deportable offense at trial.  Such LPRs did not engage in the overt 
conduct reflecting an intention to preserve eligibility for 212(c) relief that 
those accepting a plea bargain presumably did.220  However, it is unsettled 
whether these LPRs should be altogether denied 212(c) relief for this 
difference. 
The circuit courts differ in deciding when an LPR convicted at trial can 
still rely on section 212(c).221  The courts are split in two different ways:  
whether these LPRs are eligible for 212(c) relief and how reliance on the 
prior availability of 212(c) factors into reaching this determination.222  This 
part groups the circuit courts according to whether they allow LPRs 
convicted after a trial to apply for 212(c) relief and whether they permit 
relief on a categorical basis.  The Third and Eighth Circuits have held that 
all LPRs convicted by trial pre-repeal can still rely on this relief post-
repeal.223  On the other hand, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second, 
Fifth, and Tenth Circuits hold that some LPRs convicted at trial may remain 
eligible for 212(c) relief, depending on a showing of reliance on the 
continuing existence of the relief before its repeal.224  Finally, the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals for the First, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh 
Circuits categorically bar LPRs convicted by trial pre-repeal from applying 
for 212(c) relief post-repeal.225 
Additionally, within these three categories, the courts are further divided 
on whether, and to what extent, they should consider in the retroactivity 
analysis an LPR’s reliance on the prior state of the law.  Thus, within each 
of these sections, the courts are divided among those that do not require an 
LPR to have relied on the prior availability of 212(c) to make its repeal 
impermissibly retroactive, those that require an objectively reasonable 
reliance, and those that require a subjective, individualized showing of 
 
 219. See supra Part I.C.2. 
 220. Rankine v. Reno, 319 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 221. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5–7, Ferguson v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 1735 (2010) 
(No. 09-263), 2009 WL 2842077 at *6–7. 
 222. See Hem v. Maurer, 458 F.3d 1185, 1191 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 223. See Lovan v. Holder, 574 F.3d 990, 994 (8th Cir. 2009); Atkinson v. Attorney Gen. 
of the U.S., 479 F.3d 222, 231 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 224. See Carranza-de Salinas v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 200, 206 n.6 (5th Cir. 2007); Wilson 
v. Gonzales, 471 F.3d 111, 122 (2d Cir. 2006); Hem, 458 F.3d at 1189. 
 225. See Ferguson v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 563 F.3d 1254, 1271 (11th Cir. 2009), cert. 
denied, 130 S. Ct. 1735 (2010); Mbea v. Gonzales, 482 F.3d 276, 281–82 (4th Cir. 2007); 
United States v. Zuñiga-Guerrero, 460 F.3d 733, 738 & n.2 (6th Cir. 2006); Montenegro v. 
Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1035, 1037 (7th Cir. 2004); Dias v. INS, 311 F.3d 456, 458 (1st Cir. 
2002); Armendariz-Montoya v. Sonchik, 291 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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reliance.  Part II.A first discusses the circuits that categorically allow the 
relevant LPRs to apply for 212(c) relief.  Part II.B discusses those that 
allow relief, dependent on a showing of reliance, and Part II.C discusses 
those that categorically bar these LPRs from 212(c) relief.  Threaded 
throughout this part is a discussion of the role of reliance in each of these 
respective approaches. 
A.  Categorical Section 212(c) Eligibility:  Third and Eighth Circuits 
Both the Third and Eighth Circuits have held that IIRIRA’s repeal of 
212(c) relief has no consequence on any pre-enactment convictions of 
deportable offenses, regardless of the specific mode of conviction.226  That 
is, even an LPR convicted of a deportable offense by trial pre-repeal is still 
eligible for 212(c) relief.  Neither court requires any showing of reliance on 
the continuing existence of 212(c) relief for these LPRs to remain eligible 
for relief post-repeal.227  Further, the rules of the two circuits do not differ 
in any meaningful way, as the Eighth Circuit expressly follows the 
approach of the Third Circuit.228  Therefore, this Note only discusses the 
Third Circuit’s approach. 
The Third Circuit first dealt with this issue in Ponnapula v. Ashcroft.229  
There, it held that noncitizens that turned down a plea agreement and 
proceeded to trial had a reliance interest in the availability of 212(c) 
relief.230  Specifically, as in Ponnapula’s case, an LPR could have decided 
to go to trial because it was very likely that if he were convicted, he would 
only receive a short term of imprisonment, which would keep him 
statutorily eligible for 212(c) relief at the time.231  In dicta, however, the 
court said that it highly doubted that noncitizens that went to trial without 
being offered a plea agreement have a reliance interest that renders the 
repeal impermissibly retroactive, because they had no opportunity to change 
their course of conduct throughout the criminal process in reliance on the 
availability of such relief.232 
Later, in Atkinson v. Attorney General of the U.S.,233 the Third Circuit 
held that the repeal of 212(c) relief cannot be applied retroactively, even to 
a noncitizen convicted of a deportable offense by trial.234  A judge below 
believed that Atkinson had to show reasonable reliance on the preexisting 
state of the law (the availability of 212(c) relief) to render the repeal 
 
 226. See Lovan, 574 F.3d at 993–94; Atkinson, 479 F.3d at 229–30. 
 227. Lovan, 574 F.3d at 994; Atkinson, 479 F.3d at 231. 
 228. See Lovan, 574 F.3d at 993. 
 229. 373 F.3d 480 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 230. Id. at 494, 496. 
 231. See id. at 484; see also Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(c) (1994) (repealed 1996) (barring relief to noncitizens convicted of an aggravated 
felony for which a term of imprisonment of at least five years is served). 
 232. See Ponnapula, 373 F.3d at 494; see also Atkinson, 479 F.3d at 231 (classifying as 
dicta the language in Ponnapula that doubts that an LPR convicted by a jury can prove that 
the repeal of 212(c) is impermissible). 
 233. 479 F.3d 222 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 234. Id. at 231. 
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impermissibly retroactive.235  Because Atkinson failed to do this, the lower 
court denied him the opportunity to apply for 212(c) relief.236 
The Third Circuit then analyzed the Supreme Court’s retroactivity 
jurisprudence, as espoused in Landgraf and its progeny, and ultimately 
disagreed with the district court’s conclusion that reliance on the prior state 
of the law was required to make the repeal impermissibly retroactive.237  
The panel held that whether the individual 
actually relied on the prior state of the law is not the conclusive factor in 
determining whether the amendment as a whole is to be applied 
retroactively or prospectively.  Impermissible retroactivity, as defined in 
Landgraf, does not require that those affected by the change in law have 
relied on the prior state of the law.238 
The court observed that the Supreme Court never made reliance the sine 
qua non of the retroactivity inquiry.239  The Landgraf test is one of statutory 
construction, not of reliance by individual parties.240  Therefore, the Third 
Circuit focuses on whether IIRIRA “attached new legal consequences to 
Atkinson’s conviction.”241  The court held that new legal consequences 
were indeed attached, since prior to IIRIRA’s enactment Atkinson could 
apply for 212(c) relief, but he lost that right after its enactment.242  The new 
legal consequence attached to the event already past, Atkinson’s conviction, 
was “the certainty—rather than the possibility—of deportation.”243 
The law in the Third and Eighth Circuits, then, is that no reliance on the 
continuing existence of 212(c) relief needs to be shown for an LPR 
convicted of a removable offense pre-repeal to remain eligible after the 
repeal.244  In essence, these circuits extend the Supreme Court’s rule in St. 
Cyr to all LPRs convicted of a removable offense pre-repeal, not just those 
convicted by a plea bargain.  They reason that “nothing in the Landgraf line 
of cases supports the theory that the limits of permissible retroactivity are 
 
 235. Id. at 225. 
 236. Id. 
 237. See id. at 226–29. 
 238. Id. at 229; accord Morawetz, supra note 218, at 1750–58 (arguing that reliance is a 
consideration for retroactivity analysis in cases involving economic transactions, but has no 
proper application for laws that govern wrongful conduct). 
 239. Atkinson, 479 F.3d at 231. 
 240. Van Wyke, supra note 166, at 758. 
 241. Atkinson, 479 F.3d at 230. 
 242. Id.  Atkinson, in his brief, makes a successful argument relating to this point: 
The fact that the INS was inefficient in commencing proceedings against deporta-
ble aliens in a timely fashion should not be rewarded by giving the government the 
benefit of the change of the law that puts it in a better position with regard to ef-
fecting expulsion from the United States than if the government had located Mr. 
Atkinson [before the repeal]. 
Brief of Petitioner at 27, Atkinson, 479 F.3d 222 (No. 05-1099), 2005 WL 5988286, at *27. 
 243. Atkinson, 479 F.3d at 230; accord Morawetz, supra note 218, at 1744 (explaining 
that St. Cyr recognized that an increased possibility of deportation can constitute a “new 
legal consequence” for purposes of retroactivity analysis). 
 244. See Atkinson, 479 F.3d at 231 (holding that reliance is only one consideration in 
determining whether a statute is impermissibly retroactive, not the sine qua non of such an 
inquiry); see also Lovan v. Holder, 574 F.3d 990, 994 (8th Cir. 2009). 
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different for one group—those who accept . . . a plea agreement—than they 
are for another—those who exercise their constitutional right to a trial.”245 
Allowing all LPRs convicted pre-repeal to apply for relief also comports 
with the standard rationale in retroactivity cases involving wrongful 
conduct.246  The consequences for the wrongful conduct should be 
measured by the law in effect at the time of the wrongful conduct,247 and 
the law in effect at the time of the wrongful conduct for LPRs with 
convictions before IIRIRA allowed for the possibility of 212(c) relief, not 
certainty of deportation.248 
Thus, post-St. Cyr, two circuit courts of appeals have concluded that the 
repeal of section 212(c) is impermissibly retroactive as to all convicted 
LPRs—not just those convicted by plea bargain—without any showing of 
reliance on the continuing availability of the relief.  Several circuits, 
however, do require such a showing.  Some require the LPR to belong to a 
group of individuals who could have reasonably relied on the continuing 
existence of 212(c), while others require each LPR to make an 
individualized showing of reliance. 
B.  Requiring a Showing of Reliance on the Continuing Existence of Section 
212(c) 
The Second, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits agree that the repeal of section 
212(c) can have an impermissible retroactive effect on convictions, 
regardless of whether the convictions are obtained by plea or trial.249  
However, these three circuits do not categorically allow eligibility for such 
relief—they require some showing of reliance on the continuing existence 
of 212(c) relief in deciding to forgo filing an application before the repeal.  
With respect to a showing of reliance, in the Second and Fifth Circuits, the 
LPR must make an individualized showing of reliance on the relief’s 
continuing existence.250  In the Tenth Circuit, the individual need only 
show that he belongs to a class for whom reliance on the continuing 
availability of section 212(c) would be “objectively reasonable.”251 
 
 245. Atkinson, 479 F.3d at 231; accord Lovan, 574 F.3d at 994 (“[A] determination that a 
statute has an impermissible retroactive effect ‘is applied across the board.’” (quoting 
Atkinson, 479 F.3d at 227)). 
 246. See Morawetz, supra note 218, at 1753. 
 247. See id. at 1753, 1755; see also supra note 201 and accompanying text. 
 248. See generally supra Part I.B. 
 249. See, e.g., Carranza-de Salinas v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 200, 210 (5th Cir. 2007); 
Wilson v. Gonzales, 471 F.3d 111, 122 (2d Cir. 2006); Hem v. Maurer, 458 F.3d 1185, 1191 
(10th Cir. 2006); Restrepo v. McElroy, 369 F.3d 627, 638 n.18 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[A] guilty 
plea is not the only kind of reliance that would make the abolition of 212(c) have an 
impermissible retroactive effect . . . .”). 
 250. See Carranza-de Salinas, 477 F.3d at 205–06 (noting that the Fifth Circuit requires 
that an applicant demonstrate actual, subjective reliance on the continuing existence of 
212(c) to reap its benefits); Wilson, 471 F.3d at 122 (holding that petitioners arguing for the 
ability to apply for 212(c) relief “must make an individualized showing of reliance”). 
 251. See Hem, 458 F.3d at 1200. 
2010] THE UNFORESEEN COSTS OF GOING TO TRIAL 679 
1.  Requiring an Individualized Showing of Reliance:  Second and Fifth 
Circuits 
Both the Second and Fifth Circuits hold that an LPR convicted at trial 
can be eligible for 212(c) relief if he makes an individualized showing that 
he relied on the continuing existence of 212(c) relief.252  Since their 
approaches or results do not differ, this Note discusses only the Second 
Circuit’s analysis. 
The Second Circuit’s foray into the question of how to deal with 
deportable LPRs convicted at trial after the St. Cyr decision came in 
Rankine v. Reno.253  This case consolidated the appeals of three different 
petitioners who were in similar circumstances.254  Each faced the scenario 
very familiar to the conflict in this Note:  they were convicted at trial of a 
deportable offense before the repeal of section 212(c), but removal 
proceedings did not begin until after the repeal.255 
The Second Circuit emphasized that St. Cyr does not control the 
petitioners’ situations; LPRs who chose to go to trial instead of pleading 
guilty are different than noncitizens like St. Cyr in two important ways.256  
First, they did not detrimentally change position in reliance on the 
continuing availability of 212(c) relief.257  Second, they engaged in no 
conduct reflecting an intention to preserve their 212(c) eligibility by going 
to trial.258  Those LPRs pleading guilty presumably participated in the kind 
of quid pro quo with the government that the St. Cyr court contemplated, 
giving rise to a reliance interest in the continuing availability of 212(c) 
relief.259  The Second Circuit reasoned that this reliance is what produced 
the impermissible retroactive effect in St. Cyr.260  Without altered conduct 
in reliance on the availability of relief, the repeal of IIRIRA cannot be 
impermissibly retroactive as applied to these LPRs convicted at trial.261  
Thus, the Second Circuit made it clear that it would focus on the concept of 
detrimental reliance in analyzing the retroactivity of IIRIRA as to individu-
als like the petitioners in Rankine.262 
 
 252. See Carranza-de Salinas, 477 F.3d at 205; Wilson, 471 F.3d at 122. 
 253. 319 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 254. Id. at 95–97. 
 255. See id. 
 256. Id. at 99. 
 257. See id. (“Unlike aliens who entered pleas, the petitioners made no decision to aban-
don any rights and admit guilt—thereby immediately rendering themselves deportable—in 
reliance on the availability of the relief offered prior to IIRIRA.”); see also INS v. St. Cyr, 
533 U.S. 289, 322–23 (2001) (explaining that LPRs who enter guilty pleas to their 
deportable offense give up their right to a trial to preserve their eligibility for 212(c) relief). 
 258. Rankine, 319 F.3d at 100. 
 259. See id.; see also supra note 211 and accompanying text. 
 260. Rankine, 319 F.3d at 100. 
 261. Id. 
 262. See, e.g., Martinez v. INS, 523 F.3d 365, 375 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 
1314 (2009); Wilson v. Gonzales, 471 F.3d 111, 122 (2d Cir. 2006); Restrepo v. McElroy, 
369 F.3d 627, 633 (2d Cir. 2004). 
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The Second Circuit refined its law in the 2004 case Restrepo v. 
McElroy.263  The court held that those LPRs convicted at trial sacrificed 
something, albeit different than the right to a jury trial that the noncitizen in 
St. Cyr sacrificed:  the opportunity to obtain 212(c) relief immediately by 
filing an application at the time of conviction, when it was still available, to 
increase the chance of obtaining this relief at a later date.264  The sudden 
disappearance of this relief as applied to Restrepo would, in the language of 
Landgraf, upset his “settled expectations.”265  Thus, the changes AEDPA 
made to 212(c) may be impermissibly retroactive.266 
The new rule, then, was that the repeal of 212(c) could be improperly 
retroactive as to an LPR convicted at trial who then “decide[d] to forgo the 
immediate filing of a 212(c) application based on the considered and 
reasonable expectation that he would be permitted to file a stronger 
application for 212(c) relief at a later time.”267  Essentially, Restrepo 
changed the timing of the LPR’s reliance.  Rankine held that an LPR did not 
detrimentally rely on the continuing availability of 212(c) relief in deciding 
to go to trial, but Restrepo held that an LPR may have detrimentally relied 
on the continuing availability of 212(c) relief in deciding to delay his 
application to build stronger grounds for a favorable exercise of 
discretion.268  The court, however, did not at that time decide whether an 
applicant would need to make 
an individualized showing that he decided to forgo an opportunity to file 
for 212(c) relief in reliance on his ability to file at a later date . . . , or 
whether, instead, a categorical presumption of reliance by any alien who 
might have applied for 212(c) relief when it was available, but did not do 
so, is more appropriate.269 
 The Second Circuit decided this issue two years later in Wilson v. 
Gonzales.270  There, the court held that the LPR needs to make an 
individualized showing of reliance on the continued availability of 212(c) 
relief to determine that IIRIRA is impermissibly retroactive.271  Further, that 
a potential applicant could have filed an application before its repeal does 
 
 263. 369 F.3d 627 (2d Cir. 2004).  Although this case deals directly with the retroactivity 
of AEDPA, and not IIRIRA’s repeal of 212(c), the retroactivity analysis the court uses is the 
same as it would be with IIRIRA. See, e.g., Wilson, 471 F.3d at 122 (relying on Restrepo’s 
analysis in a case involving IIRIRA’s repeal of 212(c) relief). 
 264. Restrepo, 369 F.3d at 634–35.  An LPR would want to wait as long as possible to 
file his 212(c) application because he could show “longer residence in the United States, 
deeper community ties, and, perhaps most significantly, stronger proof of rehabilitation.” See 
id. at 634; see also supra note 143 and accompanying text (discussing positive factors in the 
discretionary adjudication of a 212(c) application); infra notes 274–79 and accompanying 
text (discussing how an LPR may want to delay applying for relief to strengthen his 
application). 
 265. Restrepo, 369 F.3d at 635. 
 266. See id. at 638 (holding that Restrepo’s retroactivity argument is valid). 
 267. Id. at 634. 
 268. See Wilson, 471 F.3d at 120; see also Carranza-de Salinas v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 
200, 206 n.6, 209–10 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 269. Restrepo, 369 F.3d at 639. 
 270. 471 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 271. Id. at 122. 
2010] THE UNFORESEEN COSTS OF GOING TO TRIAL 681 
not mean that he intended to do so.272  Similarly, mere knowledge of the 
continuing availability of 212(c) is not akin to affirmative reliance.273  After 
Wilson, a potential 212(c) applicant in the Second Circuit must show that he 
knew of 212(c) and desired to apply for such relief, but decided to put off 
applying with the understanding that his chance of obtaining relief would 
gain strength over time.274  Presumably, then, the Second Circuit requires 
LPRs seeking to apply for 212(c) relief to show that they were individually 
participating in positive activities, and/or limiting exposure to negative 
activities, to strengthen their applications for relief before IIRIRA’s repeal 
took away this possibility of relief.275 
The positive and negative activities that strengthen and weaken an 
application for 212(c) relief, respectively, are best articulated through 
Marin’s listing of positive and negative factors for deciding if a 212(c) 
application will be granted.276  Accordingly, an application can be improved 
simply by waiting to file after conviction because one can show longer 
residence in the United States, deeper community ties, stronger proof of 
rehabilitation, and a more substantial history of employment in the United 
States.277  A stronger 212(c) application would also seem to result from 
limiting the adverse discretionary factors listed in Marin.278  Notably, an 
application can be improved by waiting to file because one adverse factor is 
recency of conviction.279 
Thus, both the Second and Fifth Circuits allow an LPR convicted at trial 
to apply for 212(c) relief, contingent upon a sufficient showing of reliance 
on the continuing availability of the relief.280  The reliance demonstrated 
must be subjective, or actual and specific to the individual applicant, in both 
 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. 
 274. See Walcott v. Chertoff, 517 F.3d 149, 155 (2d Cir. 2008) (discussing the state of the 
circuit case law after Restrepo and Wilson); see also Gordon, 17 I. & N. Dec. 389, 392 
(B.I.A. 1980) (“Common sense and prudence suggest that a recently convicted alien should 
prefer to let a considerable time elapse before offering to demonstrate rehabilitation.”).  The 
Fifth Circuit specifically held that delaying an application could create an impermissible 
retroactive effect because the BIA encouraged waiting until removal proceedings were 
initiated before filing an application by favoring factors for discretion that required more 
time between conviction and application. Carranza-de Salinas, 477 F.3d at 209.  Thus, 
disrupting this strategy would run contrary to “fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled 
expectations,” the touchstone considerations of impermissible retroactivity. Id. (quoting 
Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343, 358 (1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 275. See Wilson, 471 F.3d at 122 (holding that an individual must make an individualized 
showing of reliance to prove that he “delayed filing an affirmative § 212(c) application to 
build a stronger case warranting granting of that relief, believing such relief will continue to 
be available”). 
 276. See supra Part I.B.2.f. 
 277. See Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 584–85 (B.I.A. 1978); see also Restrepo v. 
McElroy, 369 F.3d 627, 634, 635 n.14 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 278. See Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. at 585 (explaining that in deciding whether or not to 
grant 212(c) relief, an IJ is required to balance the negative factors against positive factors). 
 279. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
 280. See supra notes 252–79 and accompanying text. 
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the Second and Fifth Circuits.281  The Tenth Circuit, however, allows only 
an objective form of reliance on the continuing availability of 212(c) 
relief.282 
2.  Requiring a Showing of Objectively Reasonable Reliance:  Tenth Circuit 
The Tenth Circuit considered this Note’s familiar scenario in Hem v. 
Maurer.283  The court looked to the Supreme Court’s retroactivity cases—
namely Landgraf and its progeny, Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex 
rel. Schumer284 and Martin v. Hadix285—finding that in none of these cases 
was a showing of actual reliance dispositive in determining impermissible 
retroactivity.286  Although reliance figured prominently in St. Cyr’s 
retroactivity analysis,287 this reliance was attributed to the whole group of 
LPRs “who took guilty pleas before the effective date of IIRIRA—
irrespective of any showing that St. Cyr himself actually relied on the 
availability of § 212(c) relief.”288  The Court there characterized this 
reliance as objective, not subjective, because St. Cyr was deemed to be 
relying on the continuing existence of 212(c) relief just by virtue of being 
part of the group of LPRs who pleaded guilty to their offense, without any 
inquiry into his subjective mindset in pleading guilty.289 
Thus, the Tenth Circuit concluded that only objective reliance on the 
prior state of the law is necessary to make the repeal of 212(c) 
impermissibly retroactive.290  Specifically, it held that such objective 
reliance exists for the group of LPRs that proceeded to trial but abandoned 
their right to appeal when 212(c) relief was available.291  This is so because 
such LPRs could have chosen not to appeal a conviction for fear of being 
sentenced to more than five years imprisonment on appeal, which would 
render them ineligible for 212(c) relief.292  If any member of a larger group, 
 
 281. See Carranza-de Salinas v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 200, 205 (5th Cir. 2007); Wilson, 471 
F.3d at 122. 
 282. See Hem v. Maurer, 458 F.3d 1185, 1197 (10th Cir. 2006) (“We now hold . . . that 
objectively reasonable reliance on prior law is sufficient to sustain a retroactivity claim.”). 
 283. 458 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 284. 520 U.S. 939 (1997). 
 285. 527 U.S. 343 (1999). 
 286. See Hem, 458 F.3d at 1197 (“[I]n none of the recent retroactivity cases . . . did the 
Supreme Court confer dispositive weight upon the petitioner’s actual strategic decisions.”). 
 287. See id. 
 288. Id. 
 289. See id. at 1199 (characterizing the St. Cyr decision as never requiring any actual, or 
subjective, reliance and concluding that the decision “established an objective, categorical 
scheme for determining if a statute has impermissible retroactive effects”); see also Van 
Wyke, supra note 166, at 764–65. 
 290. See Hem, 458 F.3d at 1189. 
 291. See id. at 1199. 
 292. See id.; see also supra note 152 and accompanying text.  Under Hem, though, an 
LPR does not show objective reliance by simply foregoing the right to appeal.  The LPR 
must also show that a successful appeal would place him “at risk of being sentenced to a 
sentence longer than 5 years . . . making him ineligible for § 212(c) relief.” Hem, 458 F.3d at 
1199 (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 719 (1969); State v. Grey Owl, 316 
N.W.2d 801, 803–04 (S.D. 1982)). 
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such as this one, ran “a hypothetical risk of having her expectations upset, 
then applying the new law to the past conduct of any class members would 
amount to the attachment of new legal consequences to past acts,” and thus 
impermissible retroactivity.293 
Thus, the Second, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits hold that an LPR convicted 
by trial before the repeal of section 212(c) must have relied on this relief’s 
continuing existence to reap its benefits post-repeal.  The Second and Fifth 
Circuits require a showing of individualized, subjective, reliance.  The 
Tenth Circuit requires only an objective reliance as manifested by 
membership in a group that could have reasonably relied on the relief’s 
continuing existence.  Several other circuit courts of appeals hold that LPRs 
with pre-repeal convictions by trial are categorically ineligible for 212(c) 
relief. 
C.  Denial of 212(c) Eligibility to All LPRs Convicted After Trial 
Six circuits have developed tests that result in the functional equivalent 
of a categorical denial of 212(c) relief to LPRs convicted by trial pre-repeal.  
The First, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have held 
that an LPR convicted after trial of a removable offense is ineligible for 
212(c) relief because he cannot demonstrate sufficient reliance on the 
continuing existence of the relief to make the repeal impermissibly 
retroactive.294  Again, these courts split on what kind of reliance must be 
used in this analysis.  The First, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits use an 
individualized reliance standard to categorically deny 212(c) relief from 
LPRs convicted of their pre-repeal deportable offense by a trial.295  The 
Sixth and Ninth Circuits use an objective reliance test to categorically deny 
these LPRs 212(c) relief.296  Finally, the Fourth Circuit is a model example 
of the confusion engendered by the retroactivity of 212(c) relief, with cases 
in the Fourth Circuit having vacillated between the relevance and 
irrelevance of reliance in retroactivity analysis.297 
1.  Requiring a Showing of Individualized Reliance:  First, Seventh, and 
Eleventh Circuits 
Using an individualized reliance standard to categorically deny 212(c) 
relief seems contradictory.  The circuits taking this approach, though, 
essentially require each LPR convicted at trial pre-repeal to show 
individualized reliance on the continuing existence of 212(c) relief.  At the 
same time, the courts hold that it is impossible for all LPRs convicted at 
 
 293. Van Wyke, supra note 166, at 765. 
 294. Ferguson v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 563 F.3d 1254, 1271 (11th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 
130 S. Ct. 1735 (2010); Mbea v. Gonzales, 482 F.3d 276, 281–82 (4th Cir. 2007); United 
States v. Zuñiga-Guerrero, 460 F.3d 733, 738 & n.2 (6th Cir. 2006); Montenegro v. 
Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1035, 1037 (7th Cir. 2004); Dias v. INS, 311 F.3d 456, 458 (1st Cir. 
2002); Armendariz-Montoya v. Sonchik, 291 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 295. See infra Part II.C.1. 
 296. See infra note 318 and accompanying text. 
 297. See infra Part II.C.3. 
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trial to make such a showing,298 resulting in the functional equivalent of a 
categorical denial. 
The First and Seventh Circuits take a very similar approach in 
categorically denying 212(c) relief to LPRs convicted by a trial.  The courts 
hold that the repeal of section 212(c) does not have an impermissible 
retroactive effect for those LPRs convicted of a deportable offense after 
trial.299  Reliance was the key factor in making these decisions.300 
These circuits thus require an individual seeking 212(c) relief to prove 
that he individually relied on the continuing existence of 212(c) relief.301  
However, these courts hold that LPRs proceeding to trial cannot prove this 
individual reliance.302  The result is the functional equivalent of a 
categorical denial of 212(c) relief to LPRs convicted at trial.  Thus, because, 
in these circuits’ views, LPRs going to trial were not relying on 
immigration law as it existed at that time, these individuals were not 
 
 298. See, e.g., Dias, 311 F.3d at 458 (“[H]aving been convicted after a trial where there 
was not, and could not have been, reliance by the defendant on the availability of 
discretionary relief, [the applicant] may not argue that the statute has impermissible 
retroactive effect as to him.”).  To compare, an objective reliance standard would 
automatically qualify an individual for relief just for belonging to a particular group, such as 
the group of LPRs who are convicted by a jury but forego their right to appeal. See, e.g., 
Thaqi v. Jenifer, 377 F.3d 500, 504 n.2 (6th Cir. 2004).  The individualized reliance standard 
used by the First, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits would still require each individual in a 
group to prove their personal reliance on the existence of 212(c) relief, but such reliance is 
deemed impossible for those proceeding to trial. See infra notes 301–02, 310–12 and accom-
panying text. 
 299. See Montenegro, 355 F.3d at 1037; Dias, 311 F.3d at 458 (“[A]pplication of the new 
statutory limitations on discretionary relief does not have an impermissible retroactive effect 
on those aliens who would have been eligible for discretionary relief when they were 
convicted of a felony after trial.”).  Although the specific facts of Dias v. INS, 311 F.3d 456 
(1st Cir. 2002), involve the retroactivity of AEDPA’s broadening of the criminal offenses 
that make an LPR ineligible for 212(c) relief, id. at 457, the holding is applied to IIRIRA’s 
repeal of 212(c) as well, see Nadal-Ginard v. Holder, 558 F.3d 61, 70 (1st Cir. 2009) (cha-
racterizing Dias as controlling the issue of whether IIRIRA’s repeal of 212(c) is impermissi-
bly retroactive as to an LPR convicted at trial). 
 300. See Montenegro, 355 F.3d at 1037 (reasoning that LPRs who choose to go to trial 
cannot take advantage of 212(c) relief because they “did not abandon any rights or admit 
guilt in reliance on continued eligibility for § 212(c) relief” (citing Rankine v. Reno, 319 
F.3d 93, 100–02 (2d Cir. 2003); Lara-Ruiz v. INS, 241 F.3d 934, 945 (7th Cir. 2001))); Dias, 
311 F.3d at 458 (holding that because petitioner was convicted by a jury, he could have 
relied on the availability of relief and thus cannot argue that the statute amending relief is 
impermissibly retroactive). 
 301. See Martinez v. INS, 523 F.3d 365, 385 (2d Cir. 2008) (Straub, J., concurring), cert. 
denied, 129 S. Ct. 1314 (2009).  The Seventh Circuit actually goes further, and requires even 
those LPRs who pleaded guilty to their pre-repeal offense to prove that they decided to plead 
guilty in reliance on the continuing possibility of 212(c) relief. See United States v. De Horta 
Garcia, 519 F.3d 658, 661 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 489 (2008). 
 302. See Montenegro, 355 F.3d at 1036–37 (holding that any exceptions allowing an LPR 
to apply for 212(c) relief after its repeal do not apply to the post-repeal removal proceedings 
of an LPR convicted by trial);  Dias, 311 F.3d at 458 (holding that there cannot be any 
reliance shown by an LPR convicted by a jury); see also Canto v. Holder, 593 F.3d 638, 644 
(7th Cir. 2010) (holding that LPRs who went to trial cannot have relied on the availability of 
212(c) relief), cert. denied, 79 U.S.L.W. 3015 (U.S. Oct. 4, 2010) (No. 09-1333). 
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subjected to the same inequities of those pleading guilty, and therefore 
should not be afforded the same opportunity to apply for 212(c) relief.303 
The rule in the Eleventh Circuit differs slightly from that of the First and 
Seventh Circuits.  The Eleventh Circuit did not reach the issue of an LPR 
convicted at trial of a deportable offense pre-IIRIRA until the 2009 case, 
Ferguson v. U.S. Attorney General.304  The court, however, noted that it had 
come close to the issue on two previous occasions and had all but said that 
St. Cyr’s holding did not apply to noncitizens convicted at trial, leaving 
those noncitizens ineligible for 212(c) relief.305  The Ferguson court held 
that “reliance is a core component of St. Cyr’s retroactivity analysis as it 
applies to aliens challenging the application of IIRIRA’s repeal of 
§ 212(c).”306  The court reasoned that since the Supreme Court has not 
adopted a single test for determining whether a statute is impermissibly 
retroactive,307 it is most reasonable to focus on and follow the framework 
set out by St. Cyr because the same statutory change—the repeal of 
212(c)—was at issue.308  This framework emphasized reliance.309 
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit declined to extend St. Cyr to LPRs who—
instead of pleading guilty—were convicted at trial.  Instead, it categorically 
denied all such LPRs 212(c) relief for their lack of reliance on the relief’s 
continuing existence in deciding to go to trial.310  This court adopted an 
individualized, subjective reliance requirement in doing so.311  The Eleventh 
Circuit also held that deciding to go to trial is not in itself sufficient 
individualized reliance on the availability of 212(c) relief.312  This almost 
equates to a categorical denial of 212(c) relief to LPRs convicted at trial.313  
However, the circuit specifically did not express a view on whether an LPR 
convicted at trial can successfully make an individualized showing of 
reliance by proving that he chose to wait to file his 212(c) application to 
build a better application.314  While Eleventh Circuit law currently 
 
 303. See Montenegro, 355 F.3d at 1037; Dias, 311 F.3d at 458. 
 304. 563 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1735 (2010); see id. at 1256 
(referring to the issue of the retroactivity of IIRIRA’s repeal of 212(c) relief before it as “an 
issue of first impression” for the court). 
 305. See id. at 1267–69 (discussing Alexandre v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 452 F.3d 1204 
(11th Cir. 2006); Brooks v. Ashcroft, 283 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 2002)). 
 306. Id. at 1269–70. 
 307. See supra note 185 and accompanying text. 
 308. Ferguson, 563 F.3d at 1270–71; see also Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 
(1997) (directing lower courts to follow the most analogous Supreme Court precedent when 
determining what authority directly controls). 
 309. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.  The Eleventh Circuit also felt that if it 
ignored all of the St. Cyr analysis that involved reliance, it would impermissibly render this 
discussion in St. Cyr a “gratuitous academic exercise.” Ferguson, 563 F.3d at 1270. 
 310. See Ferguson, 563 F.3d at 1271. 
 311. See id. (basing its decision to deny the petitioner 212(c) eligibility on her personal 
failure to plead guilty or personally point to any other transactions or considerations already 
past on which she relied); Joseph et al., supra note 16, at 4 (characterizing the requirement of 
Ferguson to be one of individualized reliance on the continuing availability of 212(c) relief). 
 312. See Ferguson, 563 F.3d at 1271. 
 313. See id. (holding that 212(c) relief is not available to LPRs convicted after a trial). 
 314. See Ferguson, 563 F.3d at 1271 & n.28.  Allowing such a showing to result in 212(c) 
relief is the approach of the Second and Fifth Circuits. See supra Part II.B.1.  The court did 
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categorically denies 212(c) relief to LPRs convicted at trial, the possibility 
remains that a future panel may decide that a sufficient showing of 
individualized reliance can be demonstrated by an LPR who waited to file 
his application to improve its strength. 
2.  Requiring a Showing of Objectively Reasonable Reliance:  Sixth and 
Ninth Circuits 
The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and Ninth Circuits largely take 
the same approach.  They hold that the repeal of section 212(c) is not 
impermissibly retroactive for individuals who were convicted after a trial.315  
The courts limit the holding of St. Cyr to the context of guilty pleas 
alone.316  The courts also emphasize reliance, explaining that “[u]nlike 
aliens who pleaded guilty, aliens who elected a jury trial cannot plausibly 
claim that they would have acted any differently if they had known about” 
forthcoming statutory bars to 212(c) relief.317  The reliance that the Sixth 
and Ninth Circuits require is objective reliance.318  These circuits, however, 
have not found any group of LPRs convicted at trial to meet this 
standard.319  In comparison, the Tenth Circuit requires the same objective 
reliance, but has found those LPRs convicted by trial who abandoned their 
rights to appeal when 212(c) relief was available to have objectively relied 
 
not express an opinion on this issue because Ferguson did not claim such reliance. Ferguson, 
563 F.3d at 1271 n.28. 
 315. See United States v. Zuñiga-Guerrero, 460 F.3d 733, 738 & n.2 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(holding that LPRs rejecting a plea agreement and going to trial did not reasonably rely on 
the continuing availability of 212(c) relief); Armendariz-Montoya v. Sonchik, 291 F.3d 
1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that application of AEDPA’s increased criminal bars to 
relief does not have a retroactive effect as to LPRs convicted at trial); see also Saravia-
Paguada v. Gonzales, 488 F.3d 1122, 1132 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining that the retroactivity 
analysis for all statutes barring 212(c) eligibility, whether under AEDPA or IIRIRA for 
example, is the same), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2499 (2008). 
 316. See Kellermann v. Holder, 592 F.3d 700, 707 (6th Cir. 2010); Saravia-Paguada, 488 
F.3d at 1131. 
 317. Armendariz-Montoya, 291 F.3d at 1121; accord Zuñiga-Guerrero, 460 F.3d at 738. 
 318. See Hernandez de Anderson v. Gonzales, 497 F.3d 927, 941 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding 
that an LPR demonstrates reliance on the continuing existence of 212(c) relief if it would 
have been “objectively reasonable” to rely on the continuing availability of relief ); Thaqi v. 
Jenifer, 377 F.3d 500, 504 n.2 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[U]nder St. Cyr, [a] petitioner need not dem-
onstrate actual reliance upon the immigration laws in order to demonstrate an impermissible 
retroactive effect; he need only be among a class of aliens whose [actions] ‘were likely 
facilitated’ by their continued eligibility for § 212(c) relief.” (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 
U.S. 289, 323 (2001))); see also Martinez v. INS, 523 F.3d 365, 384 (2d Cir. 2008) (Straub, 
J., concurring) (characterizing the Sixth and Ninth Circuits as requiring a showing of 
“objectively reasonable reliance” on the prior state of the law in order to make statutory bars 
to 212(c) relief impermissibly retroactive), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1314 (2009). 
 319. See Saravia-Paguada, 488 F.3d at 1131 (reaffirming a narrow reading of St. Cyr in 
the circuit’s jurisprudence and explaining that it excludes “categorically claims for § 212(c) 
relief outside the guilty plea context” (citing Armendariz-Montoya, 291 F.3d at 1122)); 
Zuñiga-Guerrero, 460 F.3d at 738–39. But cf. Haque v. Holder, 312 F. App’x 946, 947 (9th 
Cir. 2009) (implying that after being convicted by a jury, an LPR entering into a plea 
agreement still pre-IIRIRA in which he gives up a criminal appeal, may have objectively 
relied on 212(c) relief so as to make the repeal impermissibly retroactive). 
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on the continuing availability of 212(c) relief.320  By not finding any groups 
to meet the standard, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits’ result is the functional 
equivalent to a categorical denial of 212(c) relief to all LPRs convicted by 
trial. 
3.  A Case Study in Confusion:  Fourth Circuit 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has a conflicting line of 
cases on the retroactivity of 212(c)’s repeal for LPRs convicted by trial.321  
First, in Chambers v. Reno322 the court categorized the St. Cyr decision as 
dependent upon an LPR’s reasonable reliance on the continuing availability 
of 212(c) relief.323  The court then held that an LPR who, like the petitioner, 
did not plead guilty but instead was convicted by a jury, does not have a 
reliance interest comparable to that of the petitioner in St. Cyr because there 
was no quid pro quo exchange.324  Thus, the Fourth Circuit concentrated on 
the petitioner’s lack of reliance on the prior availability of 212(c) relief in 
categorically denying 212(c) relief to all LPRs convicted by trial.325 
The court muddied the reliance issue in the 2004 decision Olatunji v. 
Ashcroft.326  While Chambers dealt with the provision of IIRIRA that 
repealed 212(c) relief,327 Olatunji considered an entirely different provision 
of IIRIRA.328  Nevertheless, the court in Olatunji spoke in generalities—not 
specifics to the non-212(c) provision at issue—in holding that reliance is 
irrelevant to retroactivity analyses.329  Instead, all that is needed is the fact 
that IIRIRA attaches new legal consequences to a pre-repeal action.330  This 
conclusion was based on the fact that no Supreme Court retroactivity case 
explicitly required a showing of reliance.331  While the Chambers decision 
focused on reliance in holding that 212(c)’s repeal was not impermissibly 
retroactive,332 here, reliance in any form was cast aside as totally irrelevant 
to any retroactivity inquiry.333 
 
 320. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 321. See, e.g., Lovan v. Holder, 574 F.3d 990, 993 n.1 (8th Cir. 2009) (noting that the 
Fourth Circuit’s position on the subject is “unclear”); Ferguson v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 563 
F.3d 1254, 1264 n.18 (11th Cir. 2009) (explaining the tension between cases in the Fourth 
Circuit), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1735 (2010); Hem v. Maurer, 458 F.3d 1185, 1192 n.4 (10th 
Cir. 2006) (same). 
 322. 307 F.3d 284 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 323. Id. at 288–90. 
 324. See id. at 290; see also supra notes 210–11 and accompanying text. 
 325. See Chambers, 307 F.3d at 290–93. 
 326. 387 F.3d 383 (4th Cir. 2004). 
 327. See Chambers, 307 F.3d at 286. 
 328. See Olatunji, 387 F.3d at 386 (explaining that the case deals with a provision of 
IIRIRA that rendered the petitioner “inadmissible” because of a previous conviction). 
 329. See id. at 388 (“[W]e hold that reliance (whether subjective or objective) is not a 
requirement of impermissible retroactivity . . . .”); id. at 394 (“[W]e believe that the 
consideration of reliance is irrelevant to statutory retroactivity analysis.”). 
 330. See id. at 389. 
 331. Id. at 394. 
 332. See Chambers, 307 F.3d at 290–92 (discussing the petitioners lack of a “reliance 
interest”). 
 333. Olatunji, 387 F.3d at 396. 
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In 2007, the Fourth Circuit was again faced with the retroactive effect of 
the repeal of 212(c) for LPRs convicted at trial.334  Without any mention of 
Olatunji, the court held that Chambers squarely governed the outcome.335  
Thus, the court reaffirmed the holding that 212(c)’s repeal does not have an 
impermissible retroactive effect as to all LPRs convicted after trial.336  
Reliance made its way back into the Fourth Circuit’s retroactivity analysis:  
the court held that IIRIRA was not impermissibly retroactive as to the LPR 
specifically because the LPR did not abandon any rights in reliance on the 
prior state of the law.337 
The best way to reconcile this indecisiveness on the issue of reliance in 
212(c) retroactivity analysis is to recognize that the Chambers decision 
dealt with the provision of IIRIRA repealing 212(c), while Olatunji 
considered a different provision of the statute.338  Thus, it is likely that in 
the Fourth Circuit, IIRIRA’s repeal of 212(c) relief is not impermissibly 
retroactive as to all LPRs convicted at trial.339  Because these LPRs cannot 
make an individualized showing of reliance, they are subject to the 
functional equivalent of a categorical denial to 212(c) relief. 
Part II of this Note examined the current circuit split on whether an LPR 
convicted by trial of a deportable offense before 212(c)’s repeal can still 
rely on this relief when removal proceedings are commenced after the 
repeal.  Integrated within this conflict is disagreement on whether objective, 
individualized, or no reliance at all on the prior availability of section 
212(c) needs to be shown to make 212(c)’s repeal impermissibly 
retroactive.  To summarize, the circuit courts of appeals essentially reach 
four different conclusions.  First, two circuits hold that all LPRs convicted 
at trial pre-repeal remain eligible for 212(c) relief.340  In reaching this 
conclusion, no showing of reliance on the prior availability of 212(c) is 
made necessary in the retroactivity analysis.341  Two other circuits hold that 
an LPR convicted by trial may remain eligible for 212(c) relief if he can 
prove that he individually relied on the continuing existence of 212(c) relief 
before its repeal.342  A similar result, reached by a single circuit, is that 
some subset of LPRs convicted at trial may remain eligible for 212(c) relief, 
 
 334. See Mbea v. Gonzales, 482 F.3d 276, 278 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 335. Id. at 281–82. 
 336. See id. 
 337. Id. at 282. 
 338. See supra notes 327–28 and accompanying text.  Nevertheless, the broad language 
of Olatunji still seems like it is made to apply to all retroactivity analyses concerning any 
provision of IIRIRA, or any statute for that matter. See supra note 329 and accompanying 
text. 
 339. See, e.g., Ferguson v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 563 F.3d 1254, 1264 & n.18 (11th Cir. 
2009) (characterizing Chambers as the Fourth Circuit’s controlling law and only noting the 
tension that Olatunji creates), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1735 (2010); Hem v. Maurer, 458 F.3d 
1185, 1192 & n.4 (10th Cir. 2006) (same). 
 340. See supra Part II.A. 
 341. See supra notes 237–45 and accompanying text. 
 342. See supra Part II.B.1. 
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if it would have been objectively reasonable for the LPRs in the group to 
rely on the continuing existence of relief.343 
Finally, six circuits apply tests that result in the functional equivalent of a 
categorical denial of 212(c) relief to all LPRs convicted pre-repeal by 
trial.344  Although the result is the same for these six circuits, they differ on 
the role of reliance in their retroactivity analyses.  Some require an 
individualized showing of reliance on the continuing existence of 212(c), 
yet simultaneously hold that it is impossible for an LPR convicted at trial to 
prove such reliance.345  Others require that it would have been objectively 
reasonable for a group of LPRs to rely on 212(c) relief’s continuing 
existence, but have not found such reliance for any group of LPRs 
convicted at trial.346  Both approaches result in the functional equivalent of 
a categorical denial of 212(c) relief to LPRs convicted at trial. 
Part III discusses whether LPRs convicted at trial before 212(c)’s repeal 
should remain eligible for relief post-repeal.  It also considers the proper 
role of reliance in this analysis.  Throughout, Part III addresses the various 
jurisprudential and practical concerns raised by the differing circuit 
approaches. 
III.  ENDING THE UNFORESEEN COSTS OF GOING TO TRIAL 
Part III argues that because new legal consequences attach to past 
actions, the repeal of 212(c) relief is impermissibly retroactive as to all 
LPRs with pre-repeal convictions, regardless of the mode of conviction.347  
This is the result of a proper retroactivity analysis, using the Supreme 
Court’s Landgraf framework, where no strict requirement of reliance is 
added.  The courts that categorically deny 212(c) relief to all LPRs 
convicted of their deportable offense at trial, and those that require an 
individualized showing of reliance on the continuing existence of the relief, 
place an undue emphasis on reliance in their retroactivity analyses.  As the 
Third and Eighth Circuits have held, reliance is but one consideration of 
many in analyzing the impermissible retroactivity of a statute; it should not 
be the deciding factor in such a decision.348 
This part therefore argues that no showing of reliance is necessary for the 
repeal of section 212(c) to be impermissibly retroactive for all LPRs 
convicted of their deportable offense by trial.  Part III.A engages in an 
independent Landgraf analysis to conclude that the repeal of 212(c) is 
impermissibly retroactive for all LPRs with pre-repeal convictions.  Part 
III.B then confronts the alternative resolutions, and focuses on how these 
alternatives place an undue emphasis on reliance. 
 
 343. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 344. See supra Part II.C. 
 345. See supra Part II.C.1.  The Fourth Circuit is also likely grouped in this category. See 
supra Part II.C.3. 
 346. See supra Part II.C.2. 
 347. This is the approach of the Third and Eighth Circuits. See supra Part II.A. 
 348. See supra Part II.A; see also supra note 185 and accompanying text. 
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A.  Resolution Through Landgraf’s Analysis 
To resolve whether LPRs convicted of their deportable offense by trial 
can still rely on 212(c) relief after its repeal, one must analyze the 
retroactive effect of IIRIRA’s repeal.  As most circuit courts of appeals 
have attempted to do, this Note decides whether the repeal is impermissibly 
retroactive by following the Supreme Court’s retroactivity jurisprudence.  
Landgraf presents the standard for this analysis.349 
First, has Congress, in section 304(b) of IIRIRA where 212(c) is 
repealed,350 expressly indicated whether it intended for the repeal to apply 
retroactively for these particular LPRs?351  If so, then the inquiry is over, 
and Congress’s intentions only need be carried out.352  If Congress was not 
clear in its intentions, the question becomes:  will the repeal of 212(c) have 
retroactive effect?353  That is, will application of the repeal to these LPRs 
“impair rights [they] possessed when [they] acted, increase [their] liability 
for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already 
completed”?354  If so, courts should follow the traditional presumption 
against retroactive application, allowing the LPRs at issue to apply for 
212(c) relief.355  This section engages in this analysis and concludes that the 
approach of the Third and Eighth Circuits is truest to the Supreme Court’s 
retroactivity jurisprudence.  In refusing to make reliance the deciding factor, 
these circuits appropriately grant eligibility for relief to all LPRs convicted 
after a trial. 
1.  Landgraf Step One:  Congress Was Silent 
The first step of the Landgraf analysis is highly uncontroversial.  All 
courts of appeals undertaking this issue have appropriately decided that 
Congress was silent on whether the repeal of 212(c) was to apply 
retroactively.356  In fact, this issue is essentially foreclosed by the Supreme 
Court in St. Cyr.  There, applying its own Landgraf step one, the Court 
concluded that Congress was silent as to whether IIRIRA’s repeal of 212(c) 
was to apply retroactively.357  Since other sections of IIRIRA clearly stated 
that amendments were to be applied retroactively, and the section repealing 
212(c) did not, Congress was silent as to the repeal’s retroactivity.358  
Absent any Congressional intent, step two of Landgraf determines if the 
repeal of 212(c) can be applied to LPRs convicted at trial of their deportable 
offense before the repeal. 
 
 349. See supra notes 179–88 and accompanying text. 
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 351. See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
 352. See supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
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2.  Landgraf Step Two:  The Repeal of 212(c) Is Impermissibly Retroactive 
The Supreme Court has set out varying tests to determine, as per step two 
of Landgraf, if a statute is in fact impermissibly retroactive.359  In the 
language of Landgraf, the traditional presumption against retroactive 
application of a statute should be followed if applying the statute 
retroactively “would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, 
increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with 
respect to transactions already completed.”360  These are merely sufficient, 
rather than necessary, factors for invoking the presumption against 
retroactivity.361 
Often, the retroactivity question boils down to whether the statutory 
change created new legal consequences for past actions for LPRs convicted 
by trial.362  It is not clear which past action is the reference point for this 
retroactivity analysis:  the conviction that makes the LPR deportable, or the 
actual commission of the underlying crime.363  Whether the proper past act 
to which to refer is the conviction or the underlying criminal conduct, the 
repeal of 212(c) attaches new legal consequences, making the repeal of 
212(c) impermissibly retroactive.  Landgraf’s step two is now analyzed 
from the perspective of each of these possible past acts. 
First, suppose the conviction after a trial is the appropriate “past act” to 
reference.  As the Third Circuit reasons, new legal consequences attach to 
an LPR’s conviction of a deportable offense when 212(c) relief was 
repealed:  the right to apply for a widely granted relief from deportation was 
taken away.364  The legal consequence of the conviction pre-repeal was the 
possibility of deportation;365 the legal consequence of the conviction after 
the repeal is a much greater possibility of deportation.366  The clearest new 
legal consequence is for those LPRs who were eligible for 212(c) relief at 
their time of conviction, but are now ineligible for the replacement relief, 
cancellation of removal.367  The repeal of 212(c) changed the consequence 
of their conviction to “the certainty—rather than the possibility—of 
deportation.”368 
Also, if courts use the conviction of the deportable offense as the 
reference point, the repeal of 212(c) itself did not attach any different legal 
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consequences for convicted LPRs based on their mode of conviction.  Both 
those who were convicted by plea bargain and those convicted at trial had 
the same new legal consequence:  the impossibility of 212(c) relief 
substituted the rather strong possibility of relief.  St. Cyr restored this relief 
for one group of LPRs—those convicted by plea—because of these new 
legal consequences.369  Fairness and reason dictate that courts should restore 
this relief for all other LPRs who were subjected to the same legal 
consequences.370 
Next, suppose the commission of the crime is the appropriate “past act” 
to which to refer.  At the time of committing a pre-IIRIRA crime, an LPR 
had the comfort of knowing that his crime could not subject him to the 
certainty of deportation.  He could always attempt to have his deportation 
waived by applying for 212(c) relief, as long as he was otherwise 
eligible.371  The sudden repeal of 212(c) resulted in higher stakes for the 
commission of a crime.  Without the possibility of the widely granted 
212(c) relief,372 the probability of deportation on criminal grounds 
necessarily increases.  A greater possibility of deportation fits within the 
title of a “new legal consequence.”373  The commission of a crime suddenly 
having greater legal consequence deprives an LPR of the ability to make an 
informed cost-benefit analysis before committing a crime.  His settled 
expectations are upset because he may not have committed a crime had he 
known that it would subject him to the certainty of deportation.374 
This notion of “settled expectations,” as well as that of “fair notice,” also 
guides retroactivity analysis.375  Whether the LPR consciously thinks about 
the possibility of 212(c) relief at the time of committing a crime or not, 
there was certainly a “settled expectation” that such relief was available.  
Without “fair notice,” 212(c) relief was then repealed.376  It is conceivable 
that with such notice of the repeal of 212(c), LPRs would be much more 
careful in their conduct, and would think longer and harder before engaging 
in actions that were likely to result in the commission of a crime. 
Most importantly, though, if the commission of the crime is the past act 
for retroactivity analysis, there is no reason to distinguish between LPRs 
who were convicted of this crime by plea agreement and those convicted 
after a trial, because this distinction is not made until after the relevant point 
in time.  Thus, if the repeal of 212(c) is impermissibly retroactive for those 
LPRs who pleaded guilty to their deportable offense, as St. Cyr held,377 that 
is because the repeal attached new legal consequences to the commission of 
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a crime.  It is illogical to say that no new legal consequences attach to the 
commission of a crime for an LPR who later is convicted of this crime at 
trial.  Because he commits a crime in the same fashion as one who happens 
to later plead guilty to it, fairness and reason dictate that the result should be 
the same.378  Therefore, 212(c) is impermissibly retroactive as to those 
LPRs pleading guilty to their crimes as well. 
Thus, because new legal consequences attach to past actions of LPRs 
convicted at trial, just as they do to convictions by plea agreement, the 
repeal of 212(c) should be deemed impermissibly retroactive as to both 
groups.  This result is reached through an analysis that does not turn on 
reliance on the prior state of the law, true to the framework of Landgraf.379  
Landgraf, however, does mention that the analysis should be guided by, 
among other things, “reasonable reliance,”380 and St. Cyr emphasizes such 
reliance.381  Many courts of appeals emulate this emphasis, so this Note’s 
analysis is not complete until this undue emphasis on reliance is dispelled. 
B.  Confronting the Alternatives:  An Undue Emphasis on Reliance 
Nowhere in Landgraf’s test for impermissible retroactivity is reliance the 
deciding factor.382  Nevertheless, the Court has counseled that retroactivity 
analysis “should be informed and guided by familiar considerations of fair 
notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations.”383  It is notable that 
the Court only asks that retroactivity analyses be informed and guided by 
reasonable reliance, not determinant upon such reliance.  The Second and 
Fifth Circuits, however, hinge the availability of 212(c) relief on the ability 
of an LPR convicted at trial to prove that he individually relied on the 
continuing availability of the relief before its repeal.384  The First, Seventh, 
and Eleventh Circuits also require such an individualized showing of 
reliance, and at the same time hold that it is impossible for LPRs convicted 
by trial to prove such reliance, thereby foreclosing the possibility of relief 
from the entire group.385  As stated above, nowhere in the Supreme Court’s 
various tests for retroactivity has reliance been made the single, deciding 
factor.386 
Requiring an individualized showing of reliance on the continuing 
existence of 212(c) relief creates a significant practical problem.  Courts 
like the Second and Fifth Circuits require an LPR convicted by trial to 
prove that he individually relied on the continuing existence of 212(c) 
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before it was repealed.387  That is, he must show that he was affirmatively 
relying on the relief by strengthening his application, and it was suddenly 
pulled out from under him by IIRIRA.388 
This standard is unworkable:  the very nature of waiting to file for 212(c) 
relief strengthens the application, since one of the discretionary factors 
considered is length of time since any criminal conviction.389  Thus, it must 
be true that all LPRs convicted of their deportable offense pre-repeal, 
whether by trial or not, are relying on the continuing existence of the relief 
just by waiting.  It would seem that all an LPR would need to do is argue 
that he was convicted of his deportable offense and wanted to apply for 
212(c) relief but decided to wait until the conviction was not so recent in 
order to strengthen his application, only to see IIRIRA repeal the relief 
without notice.390  Waiting to file for 212(c) relief strengthens the 
application, and essentially becomes reliance by definition. 
Such a simple argument demonstrates individualized reliance on the 
continuing existence of 212(c) relief, and is available for all LPRs convicted 
at trial.  Thus, the approach of the circuits calling for an individualized 
showing of reliance should result in categorical 212(c) eligibility for the 
LPRs that are the subject of this Note.  This practical problem of 
individualized reliance on the continuing existence of 212(c) relief renders 
the Second, Fifth, First, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits’ approach 
inconsistent.  The First, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits’ approach is 
especially problematic, because they hold that reliance is impossible to 
prove for LPRs convicted at trial,391 while, simultaneously, waiting to file 
an application necessarily demonstrates reliance.392 
A final problem with requiring an individualized showing of reliance is 
that it inverts the traditional presumption against retroactivity.393  By 
requiring an individual to make such a specific showing of reliance, which 
may be confusing, as explained above,394 Landgraf’s presumption against 
retroactive application is eradicated.  Instead, a heightened showing to gain 
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rights that should be presumed to be available is required.  Essentially, in 
civil retroactivity, the potential for reliance on the prior state of the law is 
the reason for the presumption against retroactive application, not a 
qualifying test.395 
Reliance, however, is often made a consideration, but never the sine qua 
non of whether a statute is impermissibly retroactive or not.396  Even where 
reliance is taken into account in retroactivity analysis, it is an objectively 
reasonable reliance inquiry—not a subjective, individualized showing.397  
The Supreme Court, in St. Cyr, uses a form of objectively reasonable 
reliance to determine that the repeal of 212(c) is impermissibly retroactive 
as to all LPRs convicted by a plea agreement.398  That is, the Court placed 
the petitioner in a group with all similarly situated 212(c) applicants.  It 
then decided that it would be reasonable for any of them to rely on the 
continuing existence of 212(c) in making their plea agreement, without 
regard to whether any of them actually did so rely, and certainly without 
making any of them individually prove such reliance.  Thus, even if some 
form of reliance were required, it would only be natural to make it the 
objectively reasonable reliance referred to in St. Cyr and utilized by the 
Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits.  LPRs convicted of their offense at trial 
nevertheless display such an objectively reasonable reliance on the prior 
state of the law, just as those pleading guilty do, for two reasons. 
First, the group of LPRs convicted at trial reasonably relied on the 
continuing availability of 212(c) relief by waiting to file their applications 
to make the applications stronger.399  Because waiting can be reliance by 
definition for any individual in the group, it logically follows that waiting 
can reasonably be reliance by definition for the whole group.400 
Next, suppose an LPR, before AEDPA was enacted, was charged with a 
crime that was then considered an aggravated felony.  He would have been 
likely to retain counsel and quickly learn of the possible immigration 
consequences of a forthcoming aggravated felony conviction.  At this point 
in history, if the conviction resulted in over five years of prison time, the 
LPR would have been ineligible for the very promising 212(c) waiver of 
deportation.401  St. Cyr contemplated, and based its decision on, a situation 
in which the LPR pleaded guilty to his crime to ensure that he served fewer 
than five years so he could remain eligible for 212(c) relief.402  This 
reasonable reliance on the relief remaining in existence compelled the Court 
to prevent depriving these individuals of relief.403 
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Consider, however, an LPR who was counseled that he did not have to 
plead guilty to his offense to remain eligible for 212(c) relief because the 
sentence for his particular crime would surely be under five years even if 
the case went to trial.  The LPR therefore chose to go to trial, relying on the 
fact that if he lost, at least he still would certainly have 212(c) relief to save 
him from deportation.  This LPR made his decision in reliance on the 
continuing existence of 212(c) just as much as the one who decided to plead 
guilty.  He also had no “fair notice” that his decision to go to trial would 
actually, down the road, prevent him from utilizing 212(c) relief, while a 
decision to plead guilty would result in a clear path to such relief.  He had 
“settled expectations” that there would be no difference in his 212(c) 
eligibility based solely on his decision to go to trial versus pleading guilty 
because eligibility for the relief never made such a distinction.  Thus, “[a] 
defendant, who goes to trial believing that his opportunity to seek § 212(c) 
relief is secure, is as equally disrupted in his reasonable and settled 
expectations as is a defendant who accepts a plea believing it to confer such 
a benefit.”404 
It may be true that all LPRs deciding to go to trial did not in fact have 
these 212(c) considerations in mind.  However, it is also likely that not all 
LPRs deciding to plead guilty to their deportable offense always had 212(c) 
considerations in mind.  Some may have just wanted a lighter sentence.  
This did not stop the Court in St. Cyr from grouping together all LPRs 
pleading guilty to a deportable offense, regardless of their individualized 
motives, and allow them all the opportunity to apply for 212(c) relief.405  It 
is only fair to apply such categorical grouping to those LPRs choosing to 
exercise their constitutional right to a jury trial, allowing them all the 
opportunity to apply for 212(c) relief because it was objectively reasonable 
for any group of them to decide to go to trial in reliance on the continuing 
availability of 212(c) relief.406 
CONCLUSION 
The retroactive application of the repeal of 212(c) relief for LPRs 
convicted at trial has confused the circuit courts.407  Ideally, Congress 
would have made clear whether it intended the repeal of 212(c) relief to 
apply retroactively, as it did with other sections of the IIRIRA.408  Indeed, 
the district judge presiding over Enrico St. Cyr’s case, consolidated with 
others contending that the repeal of 212(c) should not apply retroactively, 
astutely observed that: 
[t]hese consolidated cases represent yet another example of the costly and 
unnecessary litigation that is spawned by Congress when it fails to 
indicate whether legislation should be applied retrospectively.  A one line 
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sentence could have avoided these and many other cases currently 
pending before the courts of this Circuit and its sister Circuits.409 
As the first step of a Landgraf retroactivity analysis reveals, however, 
Congress did not make its intentions clear.410 
In continuing with Landgraf’s retroactivity analysis, the best rule is that 
reached by the Third and Eighth Circuits:  the repeal of section 212(c) is 
impermissibly retroactive as to all LPRs convicted of their offense pre-
repeal, regardless of whether the conviction was obtained by plea 
agreement or by trial.  Other results reached by the circuit courts of appeals 
place an undue emphasis on reliance in their retroactivity analyses.411 
Besides being the truest to the Supreme Court’s retroactivity frameworks, 
the Third and Eight Circuits’ approach dispenses with the judicial 
inefficiency created by the Second and Fifth Circuits, which require the 
LPR to make an individualized showing of reliance on the continuing 
existence of 212(c) relief.  Absent such a requirement, there will be no need 
for an inquiry into whether a noncitizen was actually relying on the 
availability of 212(c) or not. 
The result proposed by this Note also resolves the inequity created by the 
circuits categorically foreclosing 212(c) relief from all LPRs convicted at 
trial pre-repeal:  all those who have new legal consequences attached to 
their pre-IIRIRA convictions—the new impossibility of 212(c) relief—have 
the relief restored, regardless of how the conviction came about. 
There is no reason to punish an LPR who exercised his constitutional 
right to a jury trial with the comfort of knowing that if made deportable, he 
could always apply for 212(c) relief, while favoring an LPR who pleaded 
guilty to his offense for reasons that may have been totally unrelated to the 
availability of 212(c) relief.  The majority of courts place an undue 
emphasis on reliance in their retroactivity analyses for LPRs convicted of a 
pre-repeal offense at trial.  However, “the relevant question is whether 
IIRIRA attached new legal consequences to those aliens’ convictions and 
resulting sentences.  The answer . . . is yes.”412 
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